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On January 21, 2015, 42-year-old RCMP Constable David Wynn 
succumbed to a  gunshot wound sustained five days earlier while 
investigating a stolen vehicle in St. Albert, Alberta.
Constable Wynn and an auxiliary constable had responded to the 
Apex Casino at about 3:00 am. The two officers had just reviewed 
video of the theft and were leaving  the casino when they 
encountered the suspect.
As they placed the man under arrest, he suddenly spun away from 
them, drew a concealed handgun, and opened fire, striking 
Constable Wynn in the head and the auxiliary constable in the 
torso. The man fled the scene and committed suicide in 
a nearby house. Constable Wynn was transported to a 
local hospital in grave condition and died five days 
later.
Constable Wynn had served with the RCMP for 
six years. He is survived by his wife and three 
children.
On February 1, 2105, 40-year-old BC Commercial Vehicle  Safety and 
Enforcement (CSVE)  Officer Toni Kristinsson was killed in a vehicle crash north of 
Valemount, BC.
His department vehicle  collided with a commercial vehicle, 
causing  him fatal injuries. The driver of the other vehicle 
suffered minor injuries.
Officer Kristinsson had served with CVSE for three years. He is 
survived by his wife, son, and sister.
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/
“They	 Are	 Our	 Heroes.	 We	 Shall	 Not	 Forget	 Them.”
inscription on Canada’s Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial, Ottawa
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
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professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced	 Police	 Training
Advanced training  provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for 
municipal police officers. Training  is offered in 
the areas of investigation, patrol operations and 
leadership for in-service municipal and RCMP 
police officers.
JIBC	 Police	 Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
BCACP/CACP
2015	 Police	 Leadership	 Conference
April	 12-14,	 2015
“Leading	 with	 Vision	 and	 Values”
This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference providing  an opportunity for delegates 
to hear leadership  topics discussed by world-
renowned speakers. Click here
see 
page  
40
CAPE	 2015
coming	 soon More info on p. 4
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The 15 invaluable laws of growth: live them and 
reach your potential.
John C. Maxwell.
New York,NY: Center Street, (2012).
BF 637 S4 M386 2012
Do the next right thing: surviving life's crises.
Frank O'Dea with John Lawrence Reynolds.
Toronto, ON: Viking, (2013).
BF 637 S4 O34 2013
Everybody writes: your go-to guide to creating 
ridiculously good content.
Ann Handley.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, (2014).
HF 5415.1265 H358 2014
Keeping the record straight:  introductory 
accounting for not-for-profit organizations.
Toronto, ON: Certified General Accountants 
Association of Ontario, (2012).
HF 5686 N56 K447 2012
Lean for dummies.
Natalie Sayer and Bruce Williams.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, (2012).
HD 58.9 S29 2012
Now you see it: how the brain science of 
attention will transform the way we live, work, 
and learn.
Cathy N. Davidson.
New York, NY: Viking, (2011).
BF 321 D38 2011
The presentation lab: learn  the formula behind 
powerful presentations.
Simon Morton.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, (2014).
HF 5718.22 M384 2014
Recruitment and selection in Canada.
Victor M. Catano, Willi H. Wiesner, Rick D. Hackett.
Toronto, ON: Nelson Education, (2013).
HF 5549.5 R44 R427 2013
Symptoms and signs of substance misuse.
Margaret Stark, Jason Payne-James, Michael Scott-
Ham.
Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis, (2014).
RC 564 S74 2015
Think smarter:  critical  thinking  to improve 
problem-solving and decision-making skills.
Mike Kallet.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, (2014).
HD 30.29 K35 2014
Turning  learning  into action:  a proven 
methodology for effective transfer of learning.
Emma Weber.
London; Philadelphia: KoganPage, (2014).
HD 58.82 W43 2014
Wait: the art and science of delay.
Frank Partnoy.
New York, NY: PublicAffairs, (2012).
BF 637 P76 P37 2012
What your boss really wants from you: 15 
insights to improve your relationship.
Steve Arneson.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, (2014)
HF 5548.83 A76 2014
Why motivating  people doesn't work ... and what 
does: the new science of leading, energizing, and 
engaging.
Susan Fowler.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, (2014)
HF 5549.5 M63 F69 2014
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The Canadian Association of Police Educators (CAPE) promotes excellence in law 
enforcement training  and education through the guidance of innovative research, program 
development, knowledge transfer, network facilitation, and collaborative training 
initiatives. In the changing  landscape of police training  many agencies are stretching their 
resources to do more with less. The goal of the 2015 CAPE conference is to promote 
discussion on hot topics in police training, highlighting collaboration as a mechanism to 
achieve effective and defensible training within the current economic climate.  
Sessions at the conference are designed to be short, fast-paced presentations followed by 
facilitated group discussions, panel discussions, or question and answer sessions with 
panelists to promote interaction and critical thinking. Innovations in police training in BC 
will be showcased throughout the conference and scheduled updates from various 
organizations and committees will promote collaboration. 
CAPE 2015
Canadian Association of Police Educators
Effective & Defensible Training Through Collaboration
Conference: May 20-22, 2015
Pre-conference Workshop: May 19, 2015
715 McBride Boulevard 
New Westminster, BC
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Canadian Association of Police Educators
Effective & Defensible Training Through Collaboration
Conference: May 20-22, 2015
Pre-conference Workshop: May 19, 2015
Presentation topics at the 2015 CAPE Conference include:
• Hot topics in police training:
✓ Mental readiness
✓ Two-tiered policing
✓ The Economics of policing
• Training for Vancouver’s Downtown East Side
• The JIBC continuum of training
• Assessing in the real world:
✓ Outcomes based assessment
✓ Reality-based training and assessment
✓ Blended learning: e-learning for outcomes based assessment
• Developing provincial standards:
✓ BC’s Certified Use of Force Instructor Course (CUFIC)
✓ BC’s Firearms working group
✓ Police Services Division – working towards provincial standards in BC
• Assessment Centre
• National Training Inventory
• Collaboration in Police Training
• BC’s Crisis Intervention and De-Escalation training
A limited-capacity pre-CAPE workshop on curriculum mapping will be offered where 
participants will work directly with the BC Police Academy Curriculum Developer to 
map their curriculum to the Police Sector Council National Framework of Competencies.  
There will also be opportunities to network and exchange ideas in an informal setting.
cape-educators.ca
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MR.	 BIG:	 
PROBATIVE	 VALUE	 v.	 
PREJUDICIAL	 EFFECT?
R. v. Mack, 2014 SCC 58
 
About a month after the accused’s 
roommate disappeared, the police 
received a call from a friend claiming 
that the accused had confessed to 
killing  his roommate and burning  the 
body. The police launched a Mr. Big  operation and 
obtained a wiretap  authorization to intercept the 
accused’s phone calls. The undercover Mr. Big 
operation lasted four months, involved 30 scenarios, 
and saw the accused paid about $5,000 for his work 
with the organization, plus expenses. The Mr. Big 
operation started with Ben, an undercover officer, 
meeting  the accused at a nightclub. A week later he 
was asked to help  repossess a vehicle  for which he 
was paid $200. Later, the accused was introduced to 
“Mr. Big” but declined to speak  about his missing 
roommate. He was told that it was his choice to talk, 
but refusing  to speak meant he would remain on the 
organization’s “third line”. The only way to advance 
to the “first line” was by talking  about his missing 
roommate.  The accused again refused, explaining 
that “loose lips sink ships”. 
Eventually, the accused told Ben he was willing  to 
do what it took to work with the organization. When 
asked why he killed his roommate, he said his 
roommate was “a liar, a thief, and a piece of shit 
drug  dealer.” He told Ben that he shot his roommate 
five times with a .223  rifle— four times in the chest 
and once in the back.  He said there was “nothing 
left” of the body and he took Ben to a fire pit on his 
father’s property where he said he had burned it. A 
few days later the accused was flown to meet with 
Mr. Big. He described his roommate to Mr. Big  as a 
“crack head” and said he stole  from his son’s piggy 
bank.  He again said he killed his roommate by 
shooting  him five times with a .223 rifle — four 
times in the chest and once in the  back. He added 
that there had been a “big  fire” at his dad’s place, 
and that there was “nothing  left” of the body. A week 
later he was arrested and charged with first degree 
murder.  The police searched his father’s property 
and found the victim’s remains in the fire pit that the 
accused had shown Ben.  Shell casings were also 
discovered in the  fire pit. These had been fired from 
a rifle found in the accused’s apartment.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown conceded that the wiretap 
authorization it had obtained to intercept 
the accused’s phone calls did not meet 
the requirements of the Criminal Code 
and therefore breached s. 8 of the Charter. The 
Crown, however, did not adduce any of the 
intercepted calls as evidence. The accused denied 
killing  his roommate and blamed another man for 
the murder. This other man also claimed that the 
accused had confessed to him about the killing. The 
accused argued that the statements he made to the 
two Crown witnesses were misinterpreted or untrue. 
He said that his confessions made during  the Mr. Big 
operation should be excluded because the  illegal 
wiretap  was used to design the undercover 
“[A] Mr. Big confession will be excluded where its prejudicial effect outweighs its 
probative value, or where it is the product of an abuse of process. In this context, the 
confession’s probative value is a function of its reliability. Its prejudicial effect stems from 
the harmful character evidence that necessarily accompanies its admission.”
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operation. Since the wiretap was so intertwined with 
the Mr. Big  operation, he suggested that that the 
illegality of the  authorization required excluding  his 
statements made to the undercover officers under s. 
24(2) of the Charter. 
The judge disagreed. He found the incriminating 
statements the accused made to the undercover 
officers had not been “obtained in a manner” that 
violated any of his Charter rights. A jury went on to 
convict the accused of first degree murder.
Alberta Court of Appeal 
The accused contended that the 
trial judge erred, among  other 
things, in concluding  that s. 24(2) 
was not engaged. This argument, 
however, was rejected. The Court of Appeal found 
the trial judge’s decision under s. 24(2) was entitled 
to deference and there was no basis for interfering 
with it.  The accused’s appeal from his murder 
conviction was dismissed.
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused again attacked, 
in part, the trial judge’s s. 
24(2) ruling. He wanted his 
conviction overturned and a 
new trial ordered.
Mr. Big Confessions
A seven member panel of the  Supreme 
Court noted that the accused did not 
have the benefit of R. v. Hart, 2014 SCC 
52, a decision in which a two-pronged 
framework for assessing  the admissibility of Mr. Big 
confessions was developed: 
Under the Hart framework, a Mr. Big  confession 
will be excluded where its prejudicial effect 
outweighs its probative value, or where it is the 
product of an abuse of process.  In this context, 
the confession’s probative value is a function of 
its reliability. Its prejudicial effect stems from the 
harmful character evidence that necessarily 
accompanies its admission. [para. 31] 
Justice Moldaver, writing  the Supreme Court’s 
opinion, concluded that the confessions in this case 
would have been admissible under the Hart 
framework because any prejudicial effect arising 
from the  Mr. Big  confessions was easily outweighed 
by their probative value.
As well, the confessions were not the  product of an 
abuse of process. The undercover officers did not 
engage in any improper conduct.  The accused had 
not been presented with any overwhelming 
inducements:
He had prospects for legitimate work that would 
have paid even more than the undercover 
officers were offering.  Nor did the officers 
threaten the [accused] with violence if he would 
not confess. The most that can be said is that the 
officers created an air of intimidation by 
referring to violent acts committed by members 
of the organization.  But the [accused] was not 
coerced into confessing.  This much is evidenced 
by the [accused’s] initial refusal to speak with 
Ben and [Mr. Big] about [his roommate’s] 
disappearance.  Indeed, the undercover officers 
explicitly made clear to the [accused] that he did 
not have to speak with them about [his 
roommate], and that he could remain in his 
current role within the organization. None of the 
undercover officers’ conduct approaches 
abuse. [para. 36]
s. 24(2) Charter
The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s ruling  in 
concluding  that any connection between the 
confessions and a Charter breach was insufficient to 
engage s. 24(2). The confessions had not been 
obtained in a manner that violated the accused’s 
Charter rights. In describing  the necessary 
connection, Justice Moldaver stated:
Whether evidence was “obtained in a manner” 
that infringed an accused’s rights under the 
Charter depends on the nature of the connection 
between the Charter violation and the evidence 
that was ultimately obtained.  The courts have 
adopted a purposive approach to this inquiry.  
Establishing  a strict causal relationship between 
the breach and the subsequent discovery of 
evidence is unnecessary.  Evidence will be 
7:0
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Mr. Big Confession
R. v. Mack, 2014 SCC 58: Prejudicial Effect v. Probative Value Grid
• the bad character evidence that accompanied the confessions was limited.
• none of the scenarios involved violence.
• the operation did not reveal prejudicial facts about the accused’s past 
history. 
• the accused’s involvement with the organization was primarily limited to 
assisting with repossessing vehicles and delivering packages. 
• probative value high.
• inducements provided by the undercover officers were modest.
• he was paid approximately $5,000 over a four-month period, at a time 
when well-paying, legitimate work was readily available to him.  
• he was not threatened by the officers. 
• he was told, in his first meeting with “Mr. Big”, that he could decline to say 
anything and remain on the organization’s “third line” — an option he 
initially accepted.
• there was an abundance of evidence that was potentially confirmatory.  
• his purported confessions to the other two men described the same motive 
for the killing as his confessions to the undercover officers.  
• They all made reference to burning the victim’s body.  
• immediately after confessing to Ben, the accused led him to the firepit in 
which the victim’s remains lay undiscovered
• shell casings fired from a gun found in the accused’s apartment were 
found in the same firepit.
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tainted if the breach and the discovery of the 
impugned evidence are part of the same 
transaction or course of conduct.  The required 
connection between the breach and the 
subsequent statement may be temporal, 
contextual, causal, or a combination of the 
three.  A “remote” or “tenuous” connection 
between the breach and the impugned evidence 
will not suffice. [reference omited, para. 38]
Whether or not there is a sufficient connection 
between an alleged Charter breach and the evidence 
to trigger s. 24(2)  is a question of fact entitled to 
considerable deference and will only be interfered 
with on appeal where the trial judge has failed to 
consider the proper factors or has made an 
unreasonable finding. Here, the trial judge found the 
tenuous causal connection between the s. 8 breach 
and the confessions undermined the significance of 
the temporal relationship. The Supreme Court 
declined to interfere with this fact driven exercise. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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SUPREME	 COURT	 CARVES	 NEW	 
RULES	 FOR	 MR.	 BIG	 
CONFESSIONS
R. v. Hart, 2014 SCC 52
The accused’s three-year-old twin 
daughters drowned in a lake adjacent 
to a park. He was the last person to 
see them alive. He said he took them 
to play on some swings when they 
ran onto a dock. When one daughter fell into the 
water, he panicked because he could not swim. He 
ran back to his car and drove home to get his wife. 
But he forgot about his other daughter, leaving  her 
on the dock. Upon returning  to the park, both 
daughters were found dead, floating  in the lake 
several hundred meters apart. The accused told 
police he did not call for help using  either of two 
cell phones in his car because one did not have any 
minutes on it and the other did not belong  to 
him. He also said he never thought of stopping  at a 
nearby restaurant or hospital for help instead of 
driving  all the way home to get his wife. He denied 
drowning his daughters. 
Convinced the accused had killed his daughters and 
lied about it, the police questioned him again for 
about eight hours some five weeks later. He again 
denied killing  the girls. Two weeks later though, he 
contacted police and volunteered that he had been 
untruthful. This time he said he had a seizure at the 
park  after he removed his daughters from the car.  
When the seizure passed, he could see one of his 
daughters “in the water.” His only thought was to 
drive home to his wife. He said he had lied earlier 
because  he did not want to lose his driver’s licence 
as a result of his epileptic  seizures. With insufficient 
evidence to charge him, the investigation went cold.
Two years later, the police targeted the accused in a 
Mr. Big  operation. They conducted several weeks of 
“lifestyle” surveillance, revealing  he was on 
government assistance and socially isolated. He 
rarely left home and, if he did, he was with his wife. 
Undercover officers developed a relationship  with 
the accused, eventually employing  him as a driver in 
a trucking  company. Undercover officers told him 
they were part of a criminal organization, headed by 
a “boss”.  The accused participated in simulated 
criminal activity with the officers, delivering  trucks 
that purportedly contained smuggled alcohol and 
packages with stolen credit cards. He spent several 
nights in hotels paid for by the undercover officers, 
enjoyed frequent dinners, and was paid about 
$4,470 over two months of work. He became fully 
immersed in his new fictitious life, telling  one officer 
he loved him and that they were like  brothers. One 
night the  accused confessed that he planned the 
murder of his daughters and carried them out. The 
operation continued over the next two months with 
the importance of trust, honesty and loyalty  within 
the organization constantly being  preached.  It was 
stated that those who were not trustworthy were  met 
with violence.  On one occasion, an undercover 
officer slapped another across the face in front of the 
accused. As  the operation built towards its climatic 
meeting  with Mr. Big, the accused was told of a 
forthcoming  “big  deal” that would net him between 
$20,000 and $25,000 if he participated. Later on, he 
was shown $175,000 in cash, said to be a down 
payment toward the impending deal. 
The accused was told 
that he would only be 
allowed to participate if 
M r . B i g  g a v e h i s 
approval. They said the 
organization performed 
a background check and  found a  problem.   He was 
urged to be honest during  the meeting  with Mr. Big. 
Mr. Big  told the accused that there might be some 
“heat” coming  from the deaths of his daughters and 
asked why he killed them.  He replied that he had 
suffered a  seizure, but was told by Mr. Big  not to 
“lie.” After some further prodding  by Mr. Big, the 
accused confessed to killing  his daughters because 
he feared Child Welfare was going  to take them 
away and place them with his brother. When asked 
how he did it, he said that they “fell” over the wharf 
at the park.  When pressed for more details, he 
explained that he “struck” his daughters with his 
shoulder and that they fell into the water. Two days 
later the accused took an undercover officer to the 
park  and re-enacted how the drowning  occurred. He 
was later arrested and charged with two counts of 
first degree murder. When allowed to make a phone 
call, his first call for help  went to one of the 
undercover officers. 
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In total, the accused participated in 63 scenarios 
with undercover officers, travelled to Halifax, 
Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver, stayed in 
hotels, frequently dined in some of the finest 
restaurants, and was paid $15,720 for his work. The 
full cost of the Mr. Big operation was $413,268.
Newfoundland Supreme Court
The accused testified on a voir dire that 
he worked for the fictitious criminal 
organization because he was making 
good money and was afraid of the 
undercover officers.  He denied making  his first 
confession and said that he  had lied about the other 
confessions because he was afraid of Mr. Big. The 
accused argued his confessions ought to have been 
excluded as evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
He suggested that the intimidating  and threatening 
conduct of the officers was oppressive and breached 
his rights under s. 7 (life, liberty and security of the 
person).  He also contended that this same conduct 
rendered his confessions inadmissible under the 
principled approach to the rule against hearsay 
because  the threatening  police conduct made his 
confessions unreliable.  
The judge admitted the confessions as evidence. He 
found that the accused had bonded with the 
undercover officers, continually sought more work 
from them, and was given a number of chances to 
leave the operation but made no effort to do so. He 
rejected the accused’s evidence that he felt 
threatened and intimidated by the undercover 
operatives. He was convicted on two counts of first 
degree murder. 
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The accused again argued 
that the confessions he made 
during  the Mr. Big  operation 
were inadmissible under s. 
24(2) of the Charter because they were obtained in 
breach of his right to silence under s. 7.  A two 
member majority found the  accused was under 
“state control” at the time of the confessions and 
therefore his right to silence, which can extend 
beyond situations where  an individual has been 
detained, was breached. The accused’s statement to 
Mr. Big  and the subsequent re-enactment of the 
events on the wharf resulting  from the Mr. Big 
interview should have been excluded from evidence 
at the trial. However, the  first confession was 
admissible  and a new trial was ordered.  Justice 
Barry, in dissent, was of the view that the accused’s 
right to silence was not triggered prior to 
detention. Further, even if a “state control” test was 
applicable, there was no s. 7 breach. The trial judge 
found that the accused had numerous chances to 
leave the operation but made no effort to do so. 
Justice Barry  would have also ordered a new trial but 
for a different reason.
Supreme Court of Canada
The Crown appealed the 
ordering  of a new trial, arguing, 
in part, that the trial judge did 
not err in admit t ing  the 
accused’s confessions made 
during the Mr. Big operation. 
Mr. Big Confessions 
Justice Moldaver, speaking  for a  five member 
majority, first described the Mr. Big  technique as 
follows:
The technique tends to follow a similar script in 
each case.  Undercover officers conduct 
surveillance on a suspect in order to gather 
information about his or her habits and 
circumstances. Next, they approach the suspect 
and attempt to cultivate a relationship. The 
suspect and the undercover officers socialize 
and begin to work together, and the suspect is 
introduced to the idea that the officers work for a 
criminal organization that is run by their boss — 
“Mr. Big”.  The suspect works for the criminal 
organization and is assigned simple and 
apparently illegal tasks — serving as a lookout, 
delivering packages, or counting large sums of 
money are common examples.  As occurred in 
this case, this stage of the operation can last for 
several months.  
As the operation wears on, the suspect is offered 
increasing  responsibi l i ty and f inancial 
rewards. By flying the suspect across the country, 
putting him up in hotels, and taking him to 
expensive restaurants, undercover officers show 
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the suspect that working with the group provides 
a life of luxury and close friendships.  All the 
while, the suspect is constantly reminded that 
his or her ultimate acceptance into the group 
depends on Mr. Big’s approval.
Throughout the operation, the suspect is also 
told that the organization demands honesty, trust 
and loyalty from its members.  An aura of 
violence is cultivated to reinforce these values.  
Officers teach the suspect that those who betray 
the trust of the organization are met with 
violence. They do this by telling  the suspect that 
the organization kills “rats,” or by exposing him 
to simulated acts of violence perpetrated by 
members of the organization against other 
undercover officers as punishment for imagined 
betrayals. ...
Once the stage is set, the operation culminates 
in a meeting, akin to a job interview, between 
the suspect and Mr. Big.   Invariably during these 
meetings, Mr. Big  expresses concern about the 
suspect’s criminal past and the particular crime 
under investigation by the police. As the meeting 
unfolds, it becomes clear that confessing to the 
crime provides a ticket into the criminal 
organization and safety from the police.  
Suspects may be told that Mr. Big has conclusive 
evidence of their guilt and that denying the 
offence will be seen as proof of a lack of 
trustworthiness.  In another variation, suspects 
are told that Mr. Big has learned from contacts 
within the police that a prosecution for the 
offence is imminent based on new evidence.  
The organization offers to protect the target 
through a variety of means — by offering  to 
eliminate a witness or by having someone else 
confess to the crime — if the suspect confesses 
to Mr. Big.  Throughout the interrogation, any 
denials of guilt are dismissed as lies, and Mr. Big 
presses for a confession. [references omitted, 
paras. 57-60]
Dangers of Mr. Big
The majority noted that there are  three inherent 
dangers (or risks) associated with Mr. Big operations:
• unreliable confessions, 
• prejudicial facts about the accused’s character, 
and 
• the potential for police misconduct. 
Justice Moldaver put the reliability concern this way:
 
The purpose of these operations is to induce 
confessions, and they are carefully calibrated to 
achieve that end. Over a period of weeks or 
months, suspects are made to believe that the 
fictitious criminal organization for which they 
work can provide them with financial security, 
social acceptance, and friendship. Suspects also 
come to learn that violence is a necessary part of 
the organization’s business model, and that a 
past history of violence is a boast-worthy 
accomplishment.  And during the final meeting 
with Mr. Big  — which involves a skillful 
interrogation conducted by an experienced 
police officer — suspects learn that confessing to 
the crime under investigation provides a 
consequence-free ticket into the organization 
and all of the rewards it provides. 
It seems a matter of common sense that the 
potential for a false confession increases in 
proportion to the nature and extent of the 
inducements held out to the accused.  [para. 
68-69]
As for the prejudicial effect, the evidence may show 
a jury that the accused wanted to join a criminal 
organization and that he participated in “simulated” 
crimes that he believed were real. The prejudice 
regarding  bad character evidence was explained as 
follows:
Bad character evidence causes two kinds of 
prejudice.  It causes “moral prejudice” by 
marring the character of the accused in the eyes 
of the jury, thereby creating  a risk that the jury 
will reason from the accused’s general 
disposition to the conclusion that he is guilty of 
the crime charged, or that he is deserving  of 
punishment in any event.  And it causes 
“reasoning prejudice” by distracting the jury’s 
focus away from the offence charged, toward the 
accused’s extraneous acts of misconduct (ibid.).  
When a Mr. Big  confession is admitted, the 
character evidence that accompanies it places 
the accused in a difficult situation.  In these 
cases, the accused is often obliged, as a tactical 
necessity, to testify in order to explain why he 
falsely confessed to Mr Big.  The character 
evidence that has already been admitted is 
damaging in this context because it shrouds the 
accused with an aura of distrust before he or she 
Volume 15 Issue 1 - January/February 2015
PAGE 12
steps into the witness box.  This distrust is 
compounded when the accused asks the jury to 
disregard his confession because he was lying 
when he gave it.  And all of this furnishes the 
Crown with ample fodder for a forceful attack on 
the accused’s credibility in cross-examination. 
[references omitted, paras. 74-75]
The majority also noted that Mr. Big  operations can 
become abusive, creating  the risk of police 
misconduct. The police may resort to unacceptable 
tactics in their pursuit of a confession.  “In 
conducting  these operations, undercover officers 
often cultivate an aura of violence in order to stress 
the importance of trust and loyalty within the 
organization,” said Justice Moldaver. “This can 
involve — as it did in this case — threats or acts of 
violence perpetrated in the presence of the accused.  
In these circumstances, it is easy to see a risk that 
the police will go too far, resorting  to tactics which 
may impact on the reliability of a confession, or in 
some instances amount to an abuse of process.”
To address these three concerns, the majority 
developed a framework for determining  the 
admissibility of Mr. Big  Confessions while attempting 
to strike an appropriate balance between the 
dangers posed by a Mr. Big  operation and law 
enforcements’ ability to investigate serious crime. 
The two prong  approach recognized a new common 
law rule  for admissibility, which included reliance 
on the  doctrine of abuse of process to address police 
misconduct. “The purposes of this two-pronged 
approach are  to protect an accused’s right to a fair 
trial under the Charter, and to preserve the integrity 
of the justice system,” said Justice Moldover. “Those 
are the ends that must ultimately be achieved. This 
approach strives to reach them by ensuring  that only 
those confessions that are more probative than 
prejudicial, and which do not result from abuse, are 
admitted into evidence.” 
New Common Law Rule
Under the new rule for assessing  admissibility, Mr. 
Big  confessions are presumptively inadmissible. 
However, this presumption can be rebutted if the 
Crown can establish, on a  balance of probabilities, 
that the probative value of the confession outweighs 
its prejudicial effect.
Presumptive Inadmissibility. “Where the state 
recruits an accused into a fictitious criminal 
organization of its own making  and seeks to elicit a 
confession from him, any confession made by the 
accused to the state during  the operation should be 
treated as presumptively inadmissible.” The majority 
saw many benefits with the Crown having  to 
demonstrate the confession should be admitted:
• The police design and implement Mr. Big 
operations thereby creating  the dangers of a 
potentially unreliable confession and its 
prejudicial character.
• Having  the burden of establishing  admissibility, 
the state “will be strongly encouraged to tread 
carefully in how it conducts these operations.” 
 
• The onus will encourage better record keeping 
of the operation such as recording  key 
interactions. 
Probative Value v. Prejudicial  Effect.  If the  Crown 
can establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the 
probative value of the confession (tending  to prove 
an issue)  outweighs its prejudicial effect, then the 
presumption of inadmissibility may be overcome. 
The probative  value of a confession will turn on an 
assessment of its reliability while its prejudicial 
effect flows from the bad character evidence that 
must be admitted in order to put the operation and 
the confession in context.  If the Crown cannot 
demonstrate that an accused’s confession is 
admissible, the rest of the evidence surrounding  the 
Mr. Big  operation becomes irrelevant and thus 
inadmissible. 
“Where the state recruits an accused into 
a fictitious criminal organization of its own 
making and seeks to elicit a confession 
from him, any confession made by the 
accused to the state during the operation 
should be treated as presumptively 
inadmissible.”
Volume 15 Issue 1 - January/February 2015
PAGE 13
In determining  whether the probative value of 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, a  “cost 
benefit analysis” is required. Is the value of the 
evidence worth its costs?  The goal at this stage  is for 
a judge to decide whether the evidence should be 
heard by the jury, and not whether it should be 
accepted or acted upon. The probative  value of a Mr. 
Big  confessions lies in its reliability.  “A confession 
provides powerful evidence of guilt, but only if it is 
true,” said Justice Moldaver.  “A confession of 
questionable  reliability carries less probative force, 
and in deciding  whether the probative value of a  Mr. 
Big  confession outweighs the prejudicial effect of the 
character evidence that accompanies it, trial judges 
must examine its reliability.” The prejudicial effect is 
measured through the spectre of moral and 
reasoning  prejudice. Moral  prejudice arises because 
the jury learns that the  accused wanted to join a 
criminal organization and committed a host of 
“simulated crimes” believed to be real.  Reasoning 
prejudice creates the risk that the jury will be 
distracted away from the actual charges before the 
court. 
Factors relevant to assessing  the reliability  of a Mr. 
Big  confession include the circumstances under 
which it was elicited and confirmatory evidence.
Circumstances
A judge must first look  at all the circumstances 
leading  to and surrounding  the making  of the 
confession. This will include, but is not limited to:
• The length of the operation;
• The number of interactions between the police 
and the accused;
• The nature of the relationship  between the 
undercover officers and the accused;
• The nature  and extent of the  inducements 
offered;
• The presence of any threats;
• The conduct of the interrogation itself;
• The personality of the accused, including  their 
age, sophistication, and mental health. 
According  to research, people with mental 
illnesses or disabilities, and youth, present a 
much greater risk of falsely confessing  and will 
raise greater reliability concerns.
Confirmatory Evidence
Next, the court should look to the confession itself 
for confirmatory evidence, or markers of 
reliability. This includes:
• The level of detail contained in the confession; 
• Whether the confession leads to the discovery 
of additional evidence;
• Whether the confession identifies any elements 
of the crime that had not been made public 
(e.g., the murder weapon); or 
• Whether the  confession accurately describes 
mundane details of the crime the accused 
would not likely have known had they not 
committed it (eg. the presence or absence of 
particular objects at the crime scene).  
This test looks directly at the evidence. The greater 
the concerns raised by the  circumstances in which 
the confession was made, the more important it will 
be to find markers of reliability  in the confession 
itself or the surrounding  evidence. The risk of 
prejudice may be mitigated by excluding  certain 
pieces of particularly prejudicial evidence that are 
unessential to the narrative. As well, trial judges can 
give limiting  instructions to the jury which may 
reduce the prejudicial effect of the evidence.
Abuse of Process
The doctrine of abuse of process serves as a check 
on police conduct. This inquiry  focusses on police 
behaviour in eliciting  the evidence. A Mr. Big 
operation that is abusive may, by itself, render a 
confession inadmissible or allow for a  stay of 
proceedings. Thus, weighing  the probative value and 
prejudicial effect of the conviction may be 
unnecessary. The onus will be on the accused to 
establish an abuse of process. 
There is no precise formula for determining  when a 
Mr. Big  operation will become abusive, but a 
confession becomes problematic when the will of an 
accused is overcome and a confession is coerced. 
Examples of coercive  police tactics include physical 
violence or threats of violence, or when an 
accused’s vulnerabilities are  preyed upon such as 
mental health problems, substance addictions, or 
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youthfulness. Other misconduct offending  the 
community’s sense  of fair play  and decency may 
amount to an abuse of process and warrant the 
exclusion of the statement.
Residual Discretion for Exclusion
The majority noted that it was no foreclosing  the 
possibility that a Mr. Big  confession could be 
excluded even where the new common law rule 
would allow for the  admission of it. Judges retain a 
discretion to exclude evidence where its admission 
would compromise trial fairness.
Exclusion In This Case
In this case, the majority excluded all 
three  confessions (including  the re-
enactment) because their probative 
value was outweighed by their 
prejudicial effect. Their was serious doubt about 
their reliability and no confirmatory evidence:
Each of them came about in the face of 
overwhelming  inducements.  This calls into 
question their reliability — and there is no 
confirmatory evidence capable of restoring  our 
faith in them.  As such, they carry little if any 
probative value.  On the other hand, the bad 
character evidence accompanying  the 
confessions carries with it an obvious and 
serious potential for prejudice.  In these 
circumstances, the prejudicial effect of the 
[accused’s] confessions outweighs their 
probative value. [para. 13]
Having  found the confessions inadmissible, there 
was no need to determine whether there was an 
abuse of process. The Crown’s appeal was dismissed. 
A Similar View
Justice Cromwell agreed with the majority 
on its legal framework for assessing  the 
admissibility of a Mr. Big  confession, but 
would not rule on the admissibility of the 
confessions in this case. Instead, he would leave that 
question for a judge to decide at the accused’s new 
trial. 
Same Result, Different Reasons
Justice Karakatsanis also agreed that the 
confessions ought to have been excluded. 
In her view, Mr. Big  operations create 
circumstances that compromise a 
suspect’s autonomy, undermine a confession’s 
reliability, and raise concerns about abusive state 
conduct. She found the  confessions breached the 
principle against self-incrimination protected under 
s. 7 of the Charter, which required an examination 
of four factors: (1) coercion; (2)  an adversarial 
relationship between the accused and the state; (3) 
the prospect that an unreliable confession would be 
given; and (4)  a concern that admitting  the  statement 
would increase the likelihood of abusive conduct by 
the state. She would then have excluded the 
confessions under s. 24(2). 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
SIDEBAR
More on what the SCC said about Mr. Big
“When conventional investigations fail to solve 
serious crimes, police forces in Canada have 
sometimes used the ‘Mr. Big’ technique. A Mr. 
Big operation begins with undercover officers 
luring their suspect into a fictitious criminal 
organization of their own making. Over the next 
several weeks or months, the suspect is 
befriended by the undercover officers. He is 
shown that working with the organization 
provides a pathway to financial rewards and 
close friendships. There is only one catch. The 
crime boss — known colloquially as ‘Mr. Big’ — 
must approve the suspect’s membership in the 
criminal organization. 
The operation culminates with an interview-like 
meeting between the suspect and Mr. Big. During 
the interview, Mr. Big brings up the crime the 
police are investigating and questions the suspect 
about it. Denials of guilt are dismissed, and Mr. 
Big presses the suspect for a confession. As Mr. 
Big’s questioning continues, it becomes clear to 
the suspect that by confessing to the crime, the 
big prize — acceptance into the organization — 
awaits. If the suspect does confess, the fiction 
soon unravels and the suspect is arrested and 
charged.” [para. 1-2]
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INSTRUCTION	 TO	 JURY	 ON	 
FALSE	 CONFESSIONS	 MAY	 BE	 
NECESSARY
R. v. Pearce, 2014 MBCA 70                   
 
The victim of a homicide  was found 
face down on a sofa in his home. An 
autopsy established that he had been 
brutally beaten to death, likely with a 
golf club. He had suffered at least 57 
blows and was also stabbed, likely with the broken 
shaft of a golf club.  In the kitchen sink police 
located a #4 iron and a  #2 iron. Near the deceased’s 
body police found the heads of a #3 iron and a 
driver. The broken shafts of the golf clubs (one of 
which was bloodied)  were found elsewhere in the 
residence.  There was no obvious suspect(s)  or 
motive but the accused contacted police some five 
months after the homicide. He was interviewed by 
detectives. He said he was a friend of the  victim and 
casual sex partner, and he  agreed to take a 
polygraph. The polygraph examiner told detective’s 
he believed the accused had nothing  to do with the 
victim’s death. Five days later the accused contacted 
police and insisted he speak with them. He told 
detectives that after the polygraph examination he 
became upset because it had been mentioned the 
deceased had AIDS. This, he claimed, caused him to 
remember an argument with the deceased that he 
thought he should share with the police. During  the 
interview he said he had fought with the accused. 
He drew a map of where the argument ended (near 
a sofa)  and said, “I might’ve hit him here … I did 
something really bad.”
The accused was immediately arrested for murder 
because  he had identified the exact location where 
the deceased’s body was found, information that 
was unknown to any  member of the public  except 
for the killer. The accused was left alone for two 
hours while detectives discussed what to do and to 
arrange for a video-recording  of an interrogation. 
The detectives then began an interrogation that 
lasted for just over two and one-half hours.  The 
accused repeated that he and the deceased had sex 
followed by an argument when the deceased 
revealed he had AIDS.  He told police he felt 
horrible, was angry, and “temporarily lost it.”  He 
repeatedly  said he did not remember what 
happened during  the argument except for being  very 
angry. Eventually he said he was so angry  he swung 
a golf iron at the deceased and hit him on the head 
with it. He was charged with manslaughter.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused testified he did not kill the 
deceased and said his confession was 
false. He told the jury he confessed for 
three  reasons: (1)  he was emotionally 
unstable; (2)  he was confused because  he 
was under the  influence of Tylenol 3; and (3)  the 
two police officers manipulated him into admitting 
to something  he did not do. Although the judge 
charged the jury  about the reliability  of the 
accused’s confession, he did not caution the jury 
about the phenomenon of false confessions. The jury 
returned a verdict of manslaughter and a seven-year 
sentence was imposed.  
Manitoba Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
conviction arguing  that the trial 
judge did not adequately instruct 
the jury. In his view, the judge 
failed to explain the phenomenon of false 
confessions. He posited that false confessions do 
occur despite being  counterintuitive. The Crown, on 
the other hand, contended that both counsel 
addressed the jury on the question of whether the 
accused falsely confessed which was sufficient. It 
was the Crown’s position that the jury would have 
understood that, although false confessions 
sometimes occur, the issue for them to decide was 
whether the accused’s confession might be false. 
Justice Mainella, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, described the evidentiary strength of a 
confession this way:
A confession is a statement by an accused, 
whether by words or assertive conduct, to a 
person in authority, which the prosecutor seeks 
to introduce as part of their case. The statement 
can be either inculpatory, exculpatory, or 
both. The statement can address all or some of 
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the material facts of the offence(s) the accused is 
being tried on; it need not be a full admission of 
guilt.
Historically an accused’s out-of-court statement 
to a person in authority is called a confession 
while a similar statement to someone who is not 
a p e r s o n i n a u t h o r i t y i s c a l l e d a n 
admission.  That distinction is driven by the 
application of the confessions rule, where an 
accused’s statement to a person in authority is 
presumptively inadmissible unless demonstrated 
to be voluntary.  The different terminology has 
nothing  to do with the potential probative value 
of the statement.  An admission may be more 
incriminating in a given context than a 
confession. For the purposes of my reasons I use 
these two terms inter-changeably by reference to 
the expression confession.
A confession is like no other evidence.  Our 
system of justice accepts that an accused can be 
convicted solely on the basis of their own 
confession without any confirmatory evidence of 
its truth. A confession is seen as such a powerful 
piece of evidence because of the logic that an 
innocent person is unlikely to incriminate 
themselves. [references omitted, paras. 48-50] 
Justice Mainella, however, also acknowledged that 
the phenomenon of false confessions is real. Even 
confessions that may be found to be admissible 
under the confessions rule may nonetheless be false. 
Examples of false confessions that may survive the 
voluntariness test under the confessions rule include:
• A confession made, without external pressure, 
for an ulterior purpose (notoriety, to relieve 
guilt, illness or a  disorder, or to protect another 
person);
• A confession made to escape the  pressure of 
police interrogation; 
• A confession resulting  from persuasion of guilt 
by a skillful interrogator; and 
• A confession resulting  from inhuman or 
degrading  treatment by a person not in 
authority.  
Jury Instructions
An accused is entitled to a fair  trial which includes a 
properly  instructed jury. With regards to an 
admissible  confession, a trial judge must “properly 
instruct the jury that it is for them to decide, based 
on all of the evidence, whether the confession was 
actually made and whether it was true (i.e., the 
weight, if any, to be given to it).” “Cautions are given 
not because a  jury is considered to be unintelligent, 
but because they are uninformed about the problem 
with the particular type of evidence,” said Justice 
Mainella. “The education of a jury  provided by a 
judge’s caution serves two essential purposes: to 
alert the jury to the potential danger of the evidence 
in question, and also to provide assistance to the 
jury with the necessary tools to evaluate the 
evidence in their fact-finding  function.” There is not, 
however, an obligation to instruct a jury about false 
confessions unless there is an air of reality to such a 
claim. In this case, the accused recanted his 
confession at trial. This recantation provided  an air 
of reality  to his claim that he  gave a false confession. 
Justice Mainella then described the process as 
follows:
When a claim of a false confession does have an 
air of reality, in addition to outlining the theory 
of the defence to the jury, the trial judge is 
required to relate the essential evidence to the 
claim of false confession so that the jurors may 
appreciate the value and effect of that evidence 
in arriving at a just conclusion. [reference 
omitted, para. 118]
And further:
Whether an accused’s narrative in their 
confession is consistent with or conflicts with 
“A confession is like no other evidence. Our system of justice accepts that an accused 
can be convicted solely on the basis of their own confession without any confirmatory 
evidence of its truth. A confession is seen as such a powerful piece of evidence because 
of the logic that an innocent person is unlikely to incriminate themselves.”
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the independently verifiable circumstances of 
the crime is important for a trial judge to review 
with the jury. The trial judge should also direct 
the jury to any evidence from the trial as to the 
accused’s knowledge of the crime and the 
source(s) of that knowledge. Relevant is whether 
the accused’s knowledge of the crime, as set out 
in his or her confession, is information only the 
real perpetrator would know, or alternatively, is 
information the accused may have learned from 
the police, the media or some other source 
before the confession, thereby decreasing the 
potential probative value of the confession. 
[references omitted, para. 120]
In this case, the trial judge properly instructed the 
jury in all the above aspects. As for a caution 
concerning  the  phenomenon of false confessions, 
the decision to provide one and its content is within 
the discretion of the trial judge, depending  on the 
facts of the case. While prudent, a  caution may not 
be necessary as a matter of law “where the 
explanation for the potential false confession is not 
complicated and readily understandable  by the 
jury.” 
But here, the trial judge failed to caution the jury 
about the phenomenon of false confessions, which 
Justice Mainella found was necessary given the 
circumstances. The jury needed to understand that a 
person may confess to something  they did not do 
even though such a  claim seemingly defies common 
sense. In omitting  this caution, the judge committed 
a legal error which deprived the accused of a fair 
trial. The accused’s appeal was allowed, his 
conviction was quashed, and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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U.S. v. ‘Isa, 2014 ABCA 256
 
The appl ican t , a na tu ra l ized 
Canadian citizen, was arrested in 
Canada after a lengthy investigation 
b y U . S . a n d C a n a d i a n l a w 
enforcement authorities. The U.S. had 
sought his extradition on charges of conspiracy to 
commit murder, providing  material support to 
terrorist conduct, and aiding  and abetting  the 
murder of U.S. nationals abroad. It was alleged that 
he was a member of a terrorist facilitation network 
that was responsible for suicide bombings. On the 
day of his arrest the accused spoke to a lawyer for 
45 minutes. The Canadian officer specifically told 
the lawyer that American authorities may want to 
talk to the accused later. He was then interviewed by 
a Canadian police officer, followed by a U.S. 
Department of Justice investigator. The U.S. 
interview was used in the committal hearing  to 
support extradition. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The applicant argued, among  other 
things, that his rights under s. 10(b)  of the 
Charter had been breached during  his 
post-arrest interviews and the statement 
he made to the U.S. investigator should not have 
been used at the committal hearing. The extradition 
judge, however, rejected the s. 10(b)  submission. He 
found the applicant had spoken to experienced 
counsel, controlled the length of the call, and was 
informed of the jeopardy confronting  him both in 
Canada and the U.S. The judge ordered the 
applicant’s committal into custody to await 
extradition, which was followed later by the Minister 
of Justice ordering his surrender to the U.S.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The applicant appealed the 
extradition judge’s decision in 
finding  that his rights under s. 10
(b ) were no t v io la ted . He 
suggested, in part, that his interview by the U.S. 
www.10-8.ca 
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investigator triggered a right to a second 
consultation with counsel. In his view, the U.S. 
interview constituted a “change in circumstance” 
such that a further consultation with counsel was 
triggered. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. The questioning  by 
the U.S. investigator was neither “a  non-routine 
procedure” nor was there a substantial change in 
jeopardy.
In R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 the Supreme Court of 
Canada found that some detainees will be entitled to 
an additional opportunity to speak to a  lawyer if 
there  are new non-routine police procedures. The 
Sinclair court put it this way:
The initial advice of legal counsel will be geared 
to the expectation that the police will seek to 
question the detainee. Non-routine procedures, 
like participation in a line-up or submitting to a 
polygraph, will not generally fall within the 
expectation of the advising lawyer at the time of 
the initial consultation. It follows that to fulfill 
the purpose of s. 10(b) of providing the detainee 
with the information necessary to making  a 
meaningful choice about whether to cooperate 
in these new procedures, further advice from 
counsel is necessary.
In this case, the questioning  by U.S. authorities 
would have fallen within the advising  lawyer’s 
expectations because the Canadian police officer, 
while speaking  to the  lawyer, specifically said that 
the applicant might be interviewed by U.S. 
authorities. 
As for a change in jeopardy, there was no 
fundamental and discrete change in the purpose of 
the investigation nor was there  an investigation for 
another or significantly  more serious offence not 
contemplated at the time of the  earlier consultation. 
Both the applicant and his lawyer understood from 
the beginning  about the  possibility of an interview 
with U.S. authorities to answer U.S. charges. The 
circumstances did not change such that the initial 
advice received by the applicant may have been 
inadequate. The communication to counsel that an 
interview with U.S. authorities was possible 
provided relevant information necessary for 
choosing  whether to cooperate with the police or 
not. The applicant was not constitutionally entitled 
to a second consultation.
The appeal from the decision of the  extradition 
judge to commit the applicant was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SAFETY	 SEARCH	 EXERCISED	 IN	 
REASONABLE	 MANNER
R. v. Peterkin, 2015 ONCA 8 
Two police officers were dispatched 
to investigate a  911 call connected to 
a townhouse unit at about 2:30 
am.  No one spoke during  the call 
and the line was busy on call back. 
When police arrived, the front and back doors of the 
townhouse were found to be locked, the unit was in 
darkness, no one answered the door, no sounds from 
within could be heard, and there were  no signs 
typical of an actual or attempted forced entry.  As 
they waited nearby  for the arrival of a security guard 
to let them into the premises so they could continue 
their investigation, the accused arrived on foot. They 
saw him walk into the fenced back yard of the 
townhouse unit through an open gate. He was 
talking  on a  cell phone.  When approached by the 
officers, the accused denied any connection to the 
townhouse and explained that he was just waiting 
for a  ride. He appeared nervous and avoided eye 
contact. 
Unsatisfied with the accused’s explanation, the 
officers advised him he was being  detained under 
Ontario’s Trespass to Property Act.  He was asked 
whether he wanted to speak to a lawyer, but there 
was no mention of the toll-free number for duty 
counsel or the  availability of immediate free legal 
advice. The accused produced a  driver’s licence to 
confirm his identity, but declined to speak to a 
lawyer. While  his driver’s license information was 
checked through the police computer, he began to 
act suspiciously.  He was seen tapping  his right hip 
with his right wrist, and “blading” himself to the 
officers so that his right side was furthest away from 
them.  When his driver’s licence was returned, the 
accused received it awkwardly by holding  his right 
elbow tightly to his right hip. 
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Suspecting  he was carrying  a weapon, the police 
decided, in the interests of their own safety, to 
conduct a “pat-down” search of the accused for 
weapons before  releasing  him.  When the officers 
told him they were going  to pat him down, he 
backed away, refused to permit the search, and tried 
to flee. Officers struggled with him but he was 
quickly taken to the ground and subdued. The police 
officers discovered, almost immediately, that he had 
a handgun. An officer had felt the butt of a gun on 
the right side  of the  accused’s waist and removed it. 
The struggle stopped and the accused was arrested 
for unlawfully possessing 
a firearm. The firearm 
was loaded with a bullet 
in the chamber. When 
searching  incident to his 
arrest, police recovered 40 bullets, cocaine, 
marijuana, two cellphones, and $275 in cash.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
The judge found the officers had a 
sufficient legal basis to detain the 
accused in the backyard for investigation 
and to conduct a safety search (pat-down) 
incidental to this detention. “While completing  their 
investigation, the accused conducted himself in a 
way that caused the police to reasonably suspect 
that he was armed with a weapon,” said the 
judge.  “The proposed ‘pat down’ search of the 
accused for weapons was fully justified as incidental 
to the investigative detention of the accused given 
that the reason for the search was officer safety, and 
the officers reasonably believed that their safety was 
at risk.  Of course, when the  accused refused to 
permit this incidental ‘pat down’ search for weapons 
and instead tried to flee, the  police were entitled to 
use reasonable and proportional force  to prevent the 
accused’s escape, and to conduct the necessary 
weapons search to protect themselves and the 
general public in the vicinity.”  There  was no s. 8 
Charter breach. 
The judge did, however, find two other Charter 
violations under s. 10. First, s. 10(a)  was breached 
when the police failed to advise the accused of both 
reasons for his detention; they did not tell him he 
was also being  detained in connection with the 911 
call. Second, s. 10(b) was breached when they failed 
to tell him about the availability of duty counsel and 
provide him with the toll-free number. Nevertheless, 
the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2) and the 
accused was convicted of unlawfully  possessing  a 
loaded restricted firearm and possessing  cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
warrantless safety search which 
followed his investigative detention 
was unlawful. He submitted that a 
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable 
and the Crown failed to rebut this presumption by 
establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the 
police had reasonable and probable  grounds to 
believe, at the time the search was conducted, their 
own safety or that of the public was at risk. In his 
view, a reasonable suspicion for the presence of a 
weapon reflects only a standard of possibility  which 
is not sufficient to discharge this obligation. Rather, 
the evidence must give  rise to a reasonable belief, 
which reflects a standard of probability. 
The Crown, on the other hand, contended that a 
lawful safety search incidental to an investigative 
detention requires only a  reasonable suspicion or, in 
other words, a demonstration of reasonable grounds 
to believe that police or public safety is at risk. This 
standard relates to reasonable possibility of harm, 
not a reasonable probability. In the Crown’s opinion, 
it doesn’t make sense that the power to conduct a 
limited safety search incidental to a lawful 
investigative detention should require a higher 
standard than for the detention itself. Furthermore, 
even if a higher reasonable belief standard applied, 
the Crown’s position was that the evidence in this 
case satisfied that standard.
Police Safety Searches
 
Under the common law, police officers have a 
limited power to detain a person for investigative 
purposes. The police  must have both a reasonable 
suspicion that there is a clear nexus between the 
prospective detainee and a recent or ongoing 
criminal offence. As well, the detention must be 
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executed in a reasonable manner. “The investigative 
detention should be brief and does not impose an 
obligation on the detained individual to answer 
questions posed by the police,” said Justice Watt, 
speaking for the unanimous Court of Appeal. 
As for searches incidental to investigative detention, 
they too are permissible  under the common law. 
However, such searches do not exist as a matter of 
course  and are not to be equated with the power to 
conduct a search incident to lawful arrest. Instead, 
“safety searches incidental to investigative detentions 
are justified where the officer believes on reasonable 
grounds that his or her own safety, or the  safety  of 
others, is at risk,” said Justice Watt. “The search must 
be grounded in objectively discernible  facts to 
prevent fishing  expeditions on the basis of irrelevant 
or discriminatory factors.” He added:
First, the officer’s decision to search must be 
reasonably necessary in light of the totality of the 
circumstances. It cannot be justified on the basis 
of a vague or non-existent concern for safety, nor 
can the search be premised upon hunches or 
mere intuition. Second, the safety search must 
be exercised in a reasonable manner. 
[references omitted, para. 45]
In this case, the Court of Appeal upheld the  safety 
search:
When [the accused] entered the backyard of unit 
132 at 296 Grandravine Drive, the officers were 
investigating  a static line 911 call from the unit. 
In doing  so, they were discharging  their 
common law duty to preserve the peace, prevent 
crime, and protect life and property. [The 
accused’s] entry into the fenced rear yard also 
entitled the officers to detain him to investigate a 
potential breach of the Trespass to Property Act, 
an arrestable offence under s. 9(1) of that Act.
As the interaction with [the accused] continued, 
the officers noticed several movements they 
considered to signal possession of a gun. Taps to 
the waistband of the [accused’s] pants. “Blading” 
to obstruct their view of the [accused’s] right 
side. Awkward receipt of the driver’s licence 
when the officers returned it to the [accused]. An 
indication by the officers of a pat-down search 
for the officers’ safety. Resistance. An attempt to 
flee. Apprehension and only then a search. This 
accumulation of factors fully supported a 
reasonable belief on the part of the officers that 
their safety was at stake and justified the search. 
[paras. 61-62]
Reasonable Suspicion v. Reasonable Grounds
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
(R. v. MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3), a majority 
concluded that safety searches require the officer 
believe on reasonable grounds that their safety is at 
stake  (or reasonable grounds to believe a person is 
armed or dangerous or a reasonable belief in an 
imminent threat to safety). The minority  in that 
decision took this to mean that a new, higher 
standard was created to replace the lower 
reasonable grounds to suspect standard articluated 
in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC . Justice Watt observed that 
MacDonald did not involve a safety search incident 
to an investigative  detention, but was a free-standing 
search power. In the end, Justice Watt found it 
unnecessary to determine whether the standard for 
“[S]afety searches incidental to investigative detentions are justified where the officer 
believes on reasonable grounds that his or her own safety, or the safety of others, is at 
risk. The search must be grounded in objectively discernible facts to prevent fishing 
expeditions on the basis of irrelevant or discriminatory factors.”
“First, the officer’s decision to search must be reasonably necessary in light of the totality 
of the circumstances. It cannot be justified on the basis of a vague or non-existent 
concern for safety, nor can the search be premised upon hunches or mere intuition. 
Second, the safety search must be exercised in a reasonable manner.”
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determining  the lawfulness of a safety search has 
been re-calibrated because, in this case, the test for 
a reasonable belief that the  officer’s safety  was at 
stake was satisfied. 
The safety search was lawful, the evidence 
admissible  under s. 24(2), the accused’s appeal 
dismissed, and his convictions upheld.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
PREVENTATIVE	 ARREST	 IN	 
DOMESTIC	 INCIDENT	 JUSTIFIED
R. v. Alexson, 2015 MBCA 5          
When police responded to a  911 
hang-up  call at about 4:00 am they 
saw and heard, through the living 
room window, the accused screaming 
at a  woman (his wife) and a child that 
he was “pissed off.” The wife and child appeared to 
be terrified as they were clinging  to each 
other.  When officers banged on the window and 
door, the wife ran to let them in and implored the 
officers to “take him away.”   The officers entered the 
home and noted the accused smelled strongly of 
alcohol and was likely intoxicated. He became 
verbally abusive to both the officers and his wife. 
When the  officers asked the wife to take the child to 
another room, the accused got up as if to go after 
her and the child. He was told to calm down. While 
he put on some clothes, the accused continued to 
yell profanities at the officers, despite repeated 
attempts to calm him down. He clenched his fists 
and took up a fighting  stance. Police concluded they 
would need to intervene for the wife  and child’s 
safety as well as their own. They told the accused he 
would be  taken into custody because he was 
intoxicated. He was pushed to the ground, 
handcuffed and removed from the home. The 
officers wanted to get him out of the house and 
bring  him to a detoxification centre where  he could 
sober up  and then be released. When they tried to 
place him in the police car, he braced himself 
against the back door and kicked one of the officers 
in the jaw with his steel-toed boot. He said, “I 
gotcha.”  He was arrested for assaulting  a peace 
officer in the  execution of their duty.
Manitoba Provincial Court 
Although the judge recognized this to be 
a difficult situation that escalated very 
quickly, he believed the officers should 
have done more  to resolve the  matter 
without taking  the accused into custody, which 
“clearly just inflamed the situation.”  In the judge’s 
view, there was insufficient evidence to believe  the 
accused was about to commit an assault or a breach 
of the peace in the home. Thus, the police officers 
were not acting  in the execution of their duty when 
they forcibly took him out of the  house. The accused 
was acquitted of assaulting  an officer “engaged in 
the execution of his duty.”
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The appeal judge agreed with the trial 
judge that the officers were not lawfully 
acting  in the execution of their duty when 
they forcibly  removed the accused from 
the home. The police  lacked reasonable grounds to 
believe an offence or a breach of the  peace was 
likely to occur. The forcible removal from the 
residence amounted to police assault and the 
accused was justified in using  reasonable force to 
defend himself. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
 
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal arguing  that the officers 
were lawfully acting  in the exercise 
of their duty when they removed 
the accused from the home and had the  necessary 
reasonable grounds to believe an offence or breach 
of the peace was likely if they did not intervene.
Chief Justice Chartier first observed the  difficulty 
police face in investigating domestic violence:
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Unfortunately, domestic violence incidents like 
this one are often before the courts.  What are 
officers to do when they believe a belligerent 
and intoxicated person poses a danger to others 
in the home? Do they arrest that person and risk 
being assaulted with impunity and sued in civil 
court for unlawful arrest; or, do they leave and 
risk being blamed if another member of the 
household is hurt because they did not remove 
that person?  
Police Authority to Enter the Home 
Although an individual’s home deserves special 
protection from police intrusion, the common law 
can in some cases provide authority for the police to 
enter.  In this case, the  police had the general duty to 
preserve  the  peace, prevent rime and protect life and 
property. The officers were investigating  a 911 hang-
up  call. “There can be no question that the officers 
in this case had the authority to enter the home to 
investigate the reason for the 911 call, irrespective of 
whether the person that let them in had the authority 
to do so,” said Chief Justice  Chartier.  “In fact, they 
could have used reasonable force to enter to 
ascertain the health and safety of the 911 caller, had 
it been required.  Their investigation, as brief as it 
was, led them to believe, based on their judgment 
and experience, that an assault on the wife or child 
was about to occur.”
Was the accused’s forced removal justified? 
Considering  the totality of the circumstances, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that the  officers were 
acting  in the lawful execution of their duties when 
they removed the accused from the home without a 
warrant:  
[I]n this case, the duty being  performed was 
preserving the peace and preventing  crime by 
addressing  the safety concerns of the wife and 
child.  The officer testified that he was taking the 
[accused] to a detoxification centre to prevent 
him from assaulting  them and to sober up.  He 
was not going to charge him with an offence. A 
cumulative assessment of the relevant factors 
satisfies me that the arrest and detention were 
reasonably necessary for the carrying  out of the 
duty to preserve the peace and prevent crime. It 
was a preventative and restrained measure taken 
to protect other members of the household. The 
nature and extent of the interference with the 
[accused’s] liberty was limited to the time it took 
for him to sober up.  It was also a reasonable 
interference that served an important public 
purpose. [para. 22]
 
Reasonable grounds offence likely?
Section 495(1)(a)  of the Criminal Code permits a 
police officer to arrest when they believe, on 
reasonable grounds, that a person “is about to 
commit an indictable offence.” Reasonable  grounds 
carries both a subjective and objective component: 
was the officer’s subjective belief objectively 
reasonable in the circumstances?  
“Under s. 495(1)(a)  of the Code, officers do not have 
to wait until a person overtly  threatens or becomes 
very violent before intervening,” said Chief Justice 
Chartier. “The threshold is much lower.”  There is no 
need to demonstrate a prima facie case nor does it 
require an imminent and substantial risk. Instead,  
all that is required is “the officer’s belief that an 
assault was about to occur be more likely than 
not.”  Furthermore, “the evidence that can form the 
basis for the  officer’s reasonable  grounds can be 
hearsay evidence.”
Here, the officer’s subjective belief was not in 
dispute. He believed that it was necessary to remove 
“Unfortunately, domestic violence incidents like this one are often before the 
courts. What are officers to do when they believe a belligerent and intoxicated person 
poses a danger to others in the home? Do they arrest that person and risk being 
assaulted with impunity and sued in civil court for unlawful arrest; or, do they leave and 
risk being blamed if another member of the household is hurt because they did not 
remove that person?”  
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the accused from the home to protect the safety of 
the wife  and child from assault. Moreover, his 
subjective belief was objectively supported by  the 
facts. The Court of Appeal concluded that the officer 
had reasonable grounds to arrest for an assault 
about to be committed: 
Someone had called 911 and it can reasonably 
be inferred that it was the wife; the [accused] 
was seen screaming at them; he was yelling  at 
them that he was “pissed off”; he was 
intoxicated and undeterred by the police 
presence; he attempted to go after the wife and 
child when the officers sent them to the other 
room; and he clenched his fists and took a 
fighting stance against the officers. [para. 28]
Since the arrest was lawful under s. 495(1)(a), it was 
unnecessary to decide whether the accused could 
have been arrested for a breach of the peace under 
s. 31 of the Criminal Code or at common law for an 
anticipated breach of the peace. As for the charge of 
assaulting  a police officer in the execution of his 
duty, the accused had deliberately  kicked the officer 
when he was attempting  to place him in the police 
car. The accused’s acquittal was overturned and a 
conviction was entered. The matter was remitted to 
the trial judge for sentencing. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DYNAMICS	 OF	 SITUATION	 
CONSIDERED	 IN	 ASSESSING	 
GROUNDS	 FOR	 ARREST	 
R. v. Bakajika, 2015 ONCA 2
At 9:55 pm a police officer saw a 
four door sedan parked two stalls 
away from a large SUV in a bank 
parking  lot. The bank was closed at 
the time. The unoccupied sedan had 
its lights on and windows down. The officer saw the 
accused standing  outside the SUV, leaning  into its 
door, shifting  his weight back and forth. He had 
something  in each hand. In one hand was a dark 
coloured object and in the  other was a white square, 
like a brick. As the officer approached undetected to 
investigate, he believed a drug  transaction had taken 
place, although he did not actually see anything 
exchange hands. As the accused turned, the officer 
saw a black cone cylinder in one hand and a white 
sunglass case in the other. He asked the accused to 
show his hands and said, “What’s in your hands?” 
But the accused walked over to the sedan, holding 
the black object at his side  as if to conceal it, his 
arm implanted in the side of his body. The officer 
again asked to see what was in his hands, but the 
accused continued to walk away and replied 
“nothing.” He opened the passenger door of the 
sedan and discarded both objects into the passenger 
seat. 
The officer now believed he had reasonable grounds 
to arrest the accused for possessing  a controlled 
substance. These grounds consisted of the  following 
nine factors:
1. The time of night. All the stores in the  plaza 
were closed including the bank.
2. These were the only two vehicles in the plaza. 
3. He had done a previous drug  arrest in this 
same parking lot. 
4. He had information from a confidential 
informant regarding  drug  transactions in the 
area.
5. He had taken a one day course in Pavis training 
and proactive initiatives regarding  drugs and 
weapons. 
“Under s. 495(1)(a) of the Code, officers 
do not have to wait until a person overtly 
threatens or becomes very violent before 
intervening. The threshold is much lower.”
BY THE BOOK:
Arrest: s. 495(1)(a) Criminal Code
A peace officer may arrest without warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit 
an indictable offence, ...
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6. He had seen the two vehicles, one unoccupied 
with its lights on and the other two parking 
spots over. 
7. He had seen the accused leaning  in and out of 
the SUV and the other male  in the driver's seat 
of the SUV leaning towards the accused. 
8. He had approached the vehicles, apparently 
undetected. The accused had turned and 
looked at the officer with the two objects in his 
hands and then attempted to conceal the black 
cylinder object by holding  it in an unusual 
manner by his side. 
9. The accused had refused to answer or 
cooperate  with the officer's demand to show 
him what was in his hands and discarded both 
objects into the car.
The accused was arrested, advised of his Charter 
rights, and cautioned. Police searched the cylinder 
object and found 93 grams of cocaine. In the car 
they also found some marihuana, a receipt with the 
accused’s name on it, digital scales, and three 
cellular telephones. In his pocket, police located 
$520 in $20 bills and an additional $500 in cash in 
his wallet. The accused was re-arrested for 
possessing  both cocaine and marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Justice
At trial it was agreed that the officer had 
the necessary subjective  belief for an 
arrest. However, the  accused attacked the 
objective grounds for this belief. In cross-
examining  the officer, the accused was able to get 
the following  pieces of evidence, among  others, on 
the record:
• What was seen in the  plaza  parking  lot could 
not be characterized as a hand to hand drug 
transaction like the officer had seen before. He 
did not see the black cylinder or white  object 
pass back and forth between the two men.
• His previous arrest at that plaza involved a 
person in a motor vehicle smoking a joint.
• The information he had from the confidential 
informant had nothing  to do with the two men 
and was simply about drug  trafficking  taking 
place in this area. The information was received 
seven months earlier and the officer did not 
know if it was current. 
• The ATM machine at the bank was open on a 
24 hour basis and people often go to an ATM 
because the bank is closed.
• He did not know how long  the vehicles had 
been in the  parking  lot before he  saw them nor 
did he know what the accused had been doing 
prior to seeing him leaning into the SUV. 
• He agreed that it was certainly possible that the 
accused had been to the plaza to use the ATM
• He did not smell anything  nor witness an actual 
drug transaction prior to the arrest.
Under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, a police 
officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that 
a person has committed or is about to commit an 
indictable offence before making  an arrest. The 
reasonable grounds required for a  lawful arrest have 
both a subjective  and an objective component. 
“Therefore, an arresting  officer must not only 
subjectively believe that he has reasonable and 
probable grounds on which to base the arrest, but 
those grounds must be justifiable from an objective 
point of view,” said the judge. “The test is whether a 
reasonable person standing  in the shoes of the 
arresting  police officer would conclude that the 
arrest was justified.” He also noted:
First, reasonable grounds has been described as 
credibly based probability - reasonable 
probablity. Reasonable and probable grounds 
does not amount to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, nor is it the equivalent of a prima facie 
case. The Crown need not establish more than 
that the officer had reasonable and probable 
grounds. Second, a trained officer is entitled to 
draw inferences and make deductions drawing 
on experience. Third, judicial scrutiny of 
reasonable grounds for an arrest must recognize 
the context within which the police officer's 
obligation operates. For example, the law does 
not expect the same kind of inquiry of a police 
officer deciding whether to make an arrest that it 
demands of a justice faced with an application 
for a search warrant. Therefore, in determining 
whether the reasonableness standard is met, 
the nature of the power exercised and the 
context within which it is exercised must be 
considered. The dynamics at play in an arrest 
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situation must be noted by the court because in 
many cases, including this one, the officer's 
decision to arrest must be made quickly in a 
volatile and rapidly changing situation. Judicial 
reflection is not a luxury the officer can afford. 
The officer must make his or her decision based 
on available information which is often less than 
exact or complete. [para. 33]
Although this was a close case, the judge concluded 
that the arrest was justified:
The court must consider the entirety of the 
constellation of factors taken in to consideration 
by the officer, as well as the dynamics of the 
situation in that the decision to arrest had to be 
made relatively quickly. [The officer] had 
observed some justifiably suspicious behaviour 
prior to attending at the plaza parking  lot. The 
[accused] had reacted to his inquiry in such a 
way that even considering  that the [accused] 
was not required to respond to the officer, his 
response by word and deed, particularly 
considering  the fast-paced dynamic of the 
situation was sufficient to elevate the officer's 
suspicions to meet the test for objectively 
discernible factors justifying an arrest for the 
offence of possession of controlled substance 
and, thus, justifying the subsequent search 
incidental to that arrest.
This is by no means a clear cut case. The 
constellation of objectively discernible facts 
amounting to reasonable and probable grounds 
available to the officer was not overwhelming 
but the case law is clear that reasonable and 
probable grounds is a credibly based reasonable 
probability and is not to be equated to a prima 
facie case or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Applying that test results in the appropriate 
objective standard being  met in this case. [paras. 
47-48]
The accused was convicted of possessing  marihuana 
and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions arguing  that the trial 
judge erred by finding  that the 
arresting  officer had reasonable 
and probable grounds to arrest him and that the 
search incidental to arrest was not unreasonable. As 
a consequence, he asserted that the  evidence seized 
should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter.
In a short endorsement, the Court of Appeal 
disagreed. First, the officer subjectively believed that 
he had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest. 
Second, the trial judge made no error in concluding 
that the grounds were objectively  reasonable. “The 
trial judge summarized ... the observations (nine in 
all)  that led the officer to believe that he had 
reasonable and probable grounds,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “He noted in particular, the need to 
consider ‘the  entirety of the constellation of factors 
taken into consideration by the officer as well as the 
dynamics of the  situation in that the decision to 
arrest had to be made relatively quickly’.” This was 
the proper analysis and the trial judge’s conclusions 
were sound. Since there were no Charter breaches, 
there was no need to consider s. 24(2). The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note:  Case  facts taken from R. v. Bakajaki, 
(2013) Court File No.: Halton 12-9415 (Ont.C.J.)
PLAIN	 VIEW	 DOCTRINE	 NOT	 
APPLICABLE	 TO	 STATUTORY	 
SEIZURE	 PROVISIONS
R. v. Mah & Desbiens, 2014 SKCA 135           
The police obtained and executed a 
search warrant for a residence 
pursuant to the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act (CDSA). The 
warrant authorized the police to 
search for cocaine and marihuana. In the home, 
police found, 989 grams of resin in the kitchen, half 
was on the seat of a chair pushed under the kitchen 
table and half was on the floor under the kitchen 
table in a  plastic  bag. Other things found in the 
home included marihuana, digital scales, score 
sheets, and $7,585 in cash. The two accused were 
arrested inside the home and charged with 
numerous offences including  possession of cannabis 
resin for the purpose of trafficking. 
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Saskatchewan Provincial Court
Neither accused challenged the validity 
of the search warrant, but they argued 
that the resin seized by the police was 
not admissible  because it was not 
mentioned in the search warrant. The judge found 
that s. 489(1)  of the Criminal Code  entitled the 
police to seize, in addition to the things mentioned 
in the search warrant, any thing  that had been 
obtained by, or used in the commission of an 
offence or would afford evidence in respect of an 
offence. In his view, “such a large amount of resin 
hidden under the kitchen table and on the floor 
would cause an officer to believe on reasonable 
grounds of an offence committed.” The  resin was 
admitted as evidence and convictions of possessing 
it for the purpose of trafficking, among  other 
charges, followed.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The admissibility of the evidence 
was again challenged. It was 
argued that the resin was not 
referred to in the search warrant 
nor was it in plain view. Justice Whitemore, writing 
the Court of Appeal’s opinion, found the trial judge 
erred in referring  to s. 489 of the Criminal Code 
because  the warrant was issued under the CDSA. 
However, since s.11(6)  of the CDSA uses 
substantively the same wording  as s. 489, the same 
considerations would apply and the trial judge’s 
error was therefore harmless.
Plain View
The accused submitted that s. 11(6) of the CDSA 
permits the seizure  of items not described in the 
search warrant only if they are in plain view of the 
officer conducting a lawful search. 
But Justice  Whitemore  disagreed. “In this case, the 
search was conducted under the statutory authority 
of the CDSA and thus, in my opinion, the  ‘plain 
view doctrine’ does not apply,” he said. “When 
conducting  a search pursuant to a  valid search 
warrant and authorized by s.  11(6)  of the CDSA, a 
peace officer is permitted pursuant to s. 11(8)  to 
seize, in addition to the items listed in the warrant, 
‘any thing’ he believes on reasonable  grounds relates 
to the commission of an offence. There is no 
requirement that the additional items be in ‘plain 
view’ and the Crown is not required to establish the 
components of a ‘plain view’ seizure.” He 
continued:
In this case, there is no dispute the search of the 
residence was authorized by the warrant. The 
warrant entitled the officers to enter the 
residence and search for and seize marihuana 
and cocaine. Therefore, whether the resin was 
BY THE BOOK:
Seizure of things: ss. 11(6) & (8) CDSA
Seizure of things not specified 
11(6)   A peace officer who executes a warrant 
issued under subsection (1) may seize, in 
addition to the things mentioned in the 
warrant,
(a) any controlled substance or precursor in respect of which 
the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that this 
Act has been contravened;
(b) any thing that the peace officer believes on reasonable 
grounds to contain or conceal a controlled substance or 
precursor referred to in paragraph (a);
(c) any thing that the peace officer believes on reasonable 
grounds is offence-related property; or
(d) any thing that the peace officer believes on reasonable 
grounds will afford evidence in respect of an offence under 
this Act.
…
Seizure of additional things 
11(8)   A peace officer who executes a warrant issued under 
subsection (1) or exercises powers under subsection (5) or 
(7) may seize, in addition to the things mentioned in the 
warrant and in subsection (6), any thing that the peace 
officer believes on reasonable grounds has been obtained by 
or used in the commission of an offence or that will afford 
evidence in respect of an offence.
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“hidden” or not is irrelevant. In any event, it is 
an exaggeration to say the resin was hidden, as a 
portion of it was on a chair in the kitchen and 
the chair was pushed under the kitchen table. 
The remainder was on the floor under the table. 
It was not “hidden.” The police were authorized 
to look under the table and on the chair for 
marihuana and cocaine. That the resin was not 
enumerated in the warrant is immaterial. They 
found it where they were empowered to search. 
[para. 27]
The appeal against conviction for possessing  the 
resin for the purpose of trafficking was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
GROUNDS	 FOR	 ARREST	 TO	 BE	 
VIEWED	 CUMULATIVELY,	 NOT	 IN	 
PIECEMEAL	 FASHION
R. v. Wasilewski, 2014 SKCA 138            
Police were involved in a drug 
trafficking  investigation. Undercover 
officers bought marihuana from a 
known drug  dealer named Chartier. 
He was seen being  driven by a male 
to the home of Belyk (also known to be a drug 
dealer)  in a black Volvo SUV registered to the 
accused. Chartier got out of the vehicle, went into 
Belyk’s house, made a transaction and carried back 
to the vehicle what was believed to be bags of 
marihuana. Police continued to actively surveil 
Chartier. About two months later, Chartier was to 
supply  marihuana to undercover officers but he told 
them he first had to “reload”. Knowing  Chartier 
would be going  to Belyk’s house to get more 
marihuana, the police set up  surveillance. They saw 
the same black Volvo SUV seen earlier pull up to the 
house, but this time it was driven by a female. 
Chartier got out of the vehicle and entered the 
house. He came out carrying  a Wal-Mart shopping 
bag, which the police believed contained 
marihuana. He got into the Volvo SUV and it was 
subsequently pulled over. The arresting  officer 
opened the door and told the accused (driver) she 
was under arrest for possessing  marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking. At the  same time, a second 
police officer approached the passenger side  of the 
vehicle to arrest Chartier. A strong  odour of 
marihuana was noted and the Wal-Mart bag  was 
observed at Chartier’s feet. Chartier was holding  a 
cell phone in each hand and was arrested. The Volvo 
SUV was taken back to the police  station and 
searched. The shopping  bag  was found to contain 
marihuana. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the police lacked 
reasonable and probable  grounds to 
arrest the accused and excluded all 
evidence obtained from the searches of 
her vehicle and cell phone incident to arrest, as well 
as a transcript of her interview with the police 
following  her arrest. Although there was ample basis 
to arrest Chartier, the judge noted there had been no 
targeting  of the accused and she had not been on 
police “radar” during  this particular drug 
investigation. Further, at the time of arrest, the officer 
did not have reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe the accused had been involved in any way 
with Chartier or with the drug  scene. In the  judge’s 
view, the arresting  officer needed something  which 
would impute the accused with knowledge as to the 
contents of the Wal-Mart bag  in order to have 
reasonable and probable  grounds for her arrest. The 
accused was acquitted of possessing  marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal submitting  that the trial 
judge erred in finding  the arrest 
unlawful and excluding  all of the 
evidence. In the Crown’s opinion, the trial judge 
failed to apply the “totality of the circumstances” test 
in assessing  the existence  of reasonable grounds to 
arrest. He relied solely on the absence of evidence 
for the accused's knowledge of Chartier’s criminality 
“The warrant entitled the officers to enter 
the residence and search for and seize 
marihuana and cocaine. Therefore, 
whether the resin was ‘hidden’ or not is 
irrelevant.”
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while ignoring  all of the other circumstantial factors 
such as the  previous association of her vehicle with 
Chartier and Belyk, the odour of marihuana, and the 
fact it would be unlikely for a drug  trafficker to take 
an “innocent” party  to a drug  deal. The Crown also 
contended that the police were  not required to have 
information about the identity of the accused before 
her arrest nor did the arrest require proof that she 
knew there was marihuana in the bag.
The accused, on the other hand, contended that the 
trial judge was correct in finding  that the police 
lacked reasonable grounds at the time of her arrest. 
All the police had was her presence at the time of a 
suspected offence involving  Belyk and Chartier. Her 
arrest occurred immediately after the vehicle was 
stopped and before any effort was made to identify 
her and determine her involvement. There was no 
evidence seized from the vehicle at the time of the 
arrest and no warrant had been sought to search her 
vehicle as she was unknown to the police.
Justice Lane, delivering  the Appeal Court’s decision, 
found the trial judge erred by focusing  only  on the 
immediate  circumstances of the arrest, while failing 
to consider all of the  relevant information the 
arresting  officer had available based on the 
investigation as a whole. Citing  an earlier decision of 
the Court of Appeal (R. v Shinkewski, 2012 SKCA 
63), Justice Lane set out a list of factors to be 
considered in determining  the lawfulness of a 
warrantless arrest:
• “an arresting  officer must subjectively hold 
reasonable grounds to arrest and those 
grounds must be justifiable from an 
objective point of view - in other words, a 
reasonable person placed in the position of 
the arresting  officer must be able to 
conclude there were indeed reasonable 
grounds for the arrest;  
• “an arresting  officer is not required to 
establish the commission of an indictable 
offence on a balance of probabilities  or a 
prima facie case for conviction before 
making  the arrest; but an arresting  officer 
must act on something  more than a 
"reasonable suspicion" or a hunch; 
• “an arresting  officer must consider all 
incriminating  and exonerating  information 
which the circumstances reasonably permit, 
but may disregard information which the 
officer has reason to believe may be 
unreliable; 
• “a reviewing  court must view the evidence 
available to an arresting  officer cumulatively, 
not in a piecemeal fashion; and
• “‘the standard must be interpreted 
contextual ly, having  regard to the 
circumstances in their entirety, including  the 
timing  involved, the events leading  up to the 
arrest both immediate  and over time, and 
the dynamics at play in the arrest’ and, 
context includes the experience and training 
of the arresting  officer. [references omitted, 
cited at para. 14]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside, and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“[A]n arresting officer is not required to 
establish the commission of an indictable 
offence on a balance of probabilities  or a 
prima facie case for conviction before 
making the arrest; but an arresting officer 
must act on something more than a 
‘reasonable suspicion’ or a hunch.”
“[A]n arresting officer must subjectively 
hold reasonable grounds to arrest and 
those grounds must be justifiable from an 
objective point of view - in other words, a 
reasonable person placed in the position 
of the arresting officer must be able to 
conclude there were indeed reasonable 
grounds for the arrest.” 
Volume 15 Issue 1 - January/February 2015
PAGE 29
GROUNDS	 FOR	 BREATH	 
DEMAND	 MUST	 BE	 ASSESSED	 IN	 
‘TOTALITY’
R. v. Schofield, 2015 NSCA 5
A police officer with 38  years’ 
experience including  some 600 
impaired driving  investigations saw a 
vehicle being  driven at dusk with dim 
headlights and no taillights. When the 
officer turned on his emergency lights, the vehicle 
turned into a driveway and in doing  so cut across 
the edge of the shoulder of the road and the 
driveway. The driver got out and leaned against the 
tail of the vehicle while smoking  a  cigarette. The 
officer saw a can of beer on the ground, still 
foaming. He believed it was thrown out the window 
of the vehicle. The officer recognized the driver as 
the accused. He had arrested him for a  previous 
impaired charge and later met him sober at the 
courthouse. He also knew he was a prohibited 
driver.  The officer could smell a strong  odour of 
alcohol coming  from the accused’s breath and saw 
that his eyes were glassy.  
The officer concluded that he had reasonable and 
probable grounds for reading  the breathalyzer 
demand. He escorted the accused to the police 
vehicle, read the demand for breath samples, and 
arrested him for impaired driving. He was advised of 
his right to counsel but declined to exercise it. At the 
police station he provided two breathalyzer samples 
with readings of 220mg% and 200mg%. He was 
charged with prohibited driving, operating  a motor 
vehicle while impaired, and over 80mg%. 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
The judge found the  officer subjectively 
believed that he had reasonable grounds 
to make the breath demand. But the 
judge concluded the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to make the breath demand 
from an objective point of view.  First, the judge 
discounted the foaming  can of beer because there 
was no indication that the officer actually saw him 
throw it out of the car and it would have had little to 
do anyways in assessing  whether or not there were 
grounds to make the breath demand. Second, the 
judge discounted the accused’s driving  over the 
shoulder of the driveway because there was no 
evidence presented that he had any experience 
driving  into it. Third, there was no evidence of the 
accused’s motor skills having  been impaired. As a 
result, the judge was left with two indicia of 
impairment: the strong  smell of alcohol coming  from 
the accused and his glassy  eyes. There were no 
results of sobriety testing or roadside screening. 
“The officer in this case would have had to have 
conducted further observation of the accused prior 
to making  the breath demand,” said the judge. “The 
officer could have asked the accused to perform 
sobriety tests or could have utilized an approved 
screening  device or perhaps spent more time 
speaking  to the accused.” As a result, the judge  held 
that the officer did not objectively have reasonable 
grounds to demand a  breath sample under s. 254(3) 
of the Criminal Code. The breathalyzer procedure 
was an unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 
of the  Charter and the breath sample results were 
excluded under s. 24(2). The accused was acquitted 
of the impaired driving  related charges but convicted 
of driving while prohibited under s. 259(4)(a).
BY THE BOOK:
Breath Demand: s. 254(3) Criminal Code
s. 254 (3) If a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person is committing, 
or at any time within the preceding three 
hours has committed, an offence under section 
253 as a result of the consumption of alcohol, 
the peace officer may, by demand made as soon as 
practicable, require the person
(a)   to provide, as soon as practicable,
(i)  samples of breath that, in a qualified technician’s 
opinion, will enable a proper analysis to be made to 
determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in the 
person’s blood ….
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Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the judge 
erred by ruling  that the officer did 
not have the requisite reasonable 
grounds to demand a breath test 
under s. 254(3), and in holding  that the  taking  of the 
breath tests violated his rights under s. 8  of the 
Charter.  
After reviewing  the case law on reasonable grounds, 
Justice Fichaud, speaking  for the unanimous Court of 
Appeal, found that reasonableness must be assessed 
from the officer’s perspective and described the 
following principles:
The question is - did the “totality of the 
circumstances” known to the officer at the time 
of the breath demand rationally support the 
officer’s belief?  The officer may infer or deduce, 
draw on experience, and ascribe weights to 
factors. Parliament expects the officer to do this 
on the roadside according to a statutory timeline, 
while informed by the available circumstances, 
but without either the benefit of trial processes to 
test the accuracy of his or her belief or “the 
luxury of judicial reflection”. The officer must 
identify the supporting circumstances at the voir 
dire.  But the officer was not expected to apply 
the rules of evidence at the roadside.  So the 
support may be based on hearsay. The supporting 
connection must be reasonable at the time, but 
need not be proven correct at the later voir dire 
that considers s. 254(3).
The judge should not segregate the officer’s 
criteria for piecemeal analysis, then banish each 
factor might have a stand-alone explanation.  
From the officer’s roadside perspective, the 
factors may have had corroborative weights that 
together formed a sounder platform for an 
inference of impairment. The reductive approach 
denies that corroborative potential. ...
There is no minimum period of investigation, 
mandatory line of questioning or legally essential 
technique, such as a roadside screening.  The 
judge should not focus on missing  evidence.  
Rather, the judge should consider whether the 
adduced evidence of circumstances known to 
the officer reasonably supported the officer’s 
view. [references omitted, paras. 33-35]
In this case, the trial judge erred in finding  the officer 
did not have reasonable  grounds to demand a breath 
sample. He misapplied the principles in determining 
whether reasonable grounds existed by:
• Erroneously segregating  the officer’s criteria, 
assessing  them in isolation, then eliminating 
them sequent ia l ly before consider ing 
reasonableness.
• Rejecting  the officer’s reasonable inferences 
such as the accused’s driving  over the shoulder 
of the driveway and the foaming  can of beer. 
Driving  over the shoulder was reasonably 
inferential of slight impairment despite no 
evidence of the  accused’s experience with that 
driveway. As for the foaming  can of beer, the 
officer was entitled to draw the reasonable 
inference that the beer can was “foaming” 
because  it had recently hit the ground when the 
accused discarded it. When the accused turned 
into the driveway, the officer saw “motion in the 
vehicle” and the can was “still foaming” on the 
ground a few feet from the accused. Nobody 
else was in the vicinity.  
• Not considering  the officer’s awareness of the 
accused’s history of impaired driving. The judge 
ignored the officer’s earlier arrest of the accused 
after a similar incident and observing  him at the 
courthouse sober. The officer had a rare 
opportunity to compare the accused’s varying 
demeanours – one inebriated and one sober – 
before assessing  his state for this investigation. 
The officer’s familiarity with the accused was 
part of the “totality of the circumstances”. 
• Treating  missing  evidence, such as further 
observation, a sobriety test or use of an 
approved screening  device, as a legal 
prerequisite.
“[T]he officer was not expected to apply the rules of evidence at the roadside. So the 
support may be based on hearsay. The supporting connection must be reasonable at the 
time, but need not be proven correct at the later voir dire that considers s. 254(3).”
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In holding  that the officer had an objective  basis to 
demand a breath sample under s. 254(3) under the 
totality of the circumstances, Justice Fichaud stated:
In summary, on April 3, 2010, thirteen months 
earlier, [the officer] had a similar encounter with 
[the accused], that led to a conviction for driving 
with excessive blood alcohol and a driving 
Prohibition Order. On May 13, 2011, [the 
officer] was aware of the earlier incident and that 
the Prohibition Order was still in effect. The 
officer had met [the accused] twice before, once 
when [the accused] was inebriated and once 
sober. From 600 impaired driving investigations 
over 38  years, the officer was well positioned to 
recognize the signs of impairment.  On May 13, 
2011, [the accused] drove over the driveway’s 
shoulder, there was a foaming beer can next to 
him, he smelled strongly of alcohol and his eyes 
were glassy.  The officer’s belief was reasonable.  
From the facts as found, the judge erred in law 
by reaching a different conclusion.
Since the breath sampling  did not violate s. 8  of the 
Charter, the evidence was admissible, the Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered on 
the impaired driving charges.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BLOOD	 DEMAND	 FOLLOWING	 
‘DRE’	 DOES	 NOT	 REQUIRE	 A	 
FURTHER	 s.10(b)	 ADVISEMENT	 
R. v. Fogarty, 2015 NSCA 6
The accused, a  methadone patient, 
collided with an oncoming  Mustang 
with two occupants. Earlier, there had 
been complaints of erratic driving  by 
his vehicle. Officers arrived on scene 
at 3:30 pm and noted the accused had glassy eyes, 
but didn’t smell of alcohol. He said he was a 
recovering  drug  addict and had taken methadone at 
8:00 am that day. The accused was transported by 
ambulance to the hospital. He was told that one of 
the Mustang’s passengers had died. While  in the 
ambulance, the accompanying  officer formed the 
opinion that the accused’s ability to operate a motor 
vehicle had been impaired by a  drug, concluding  he 
had reasonable grounds to demand that the accused 
submit to a drug  recognition evaluation (DRE) under 
s. 254(3.1)  of the  Criminal Code. The demand was 
read and the accused said he understood. When 
they arrived at the  hospital, the accused was taken to 
an emergency room, assessed by medical staff, and 
cleared. The accused was then arrested for impaired 
driving  and advised of his right to a lawyer. He said 
he wanted to speak to a lawyer and was given a cell 
phone to consult legal aid in private. A DRE 
assessment was conducted. His coordination was 
poor and unsteady, his speech was fast, slightly 
slurred, and he was stuttering  often. His face was 
flushed, his nose was runny, and his eyelids were 
droopy. Vision, divided attention, balance, hand-eye 
and psycho-physical coordination tests were also 
conducted. As well his blood pressure, pulse, body 
temperature, pupil dilation, and muscle tone were 
checked. 
Based on the DRE, the evaluator opined that the 
accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was 
impaired by a drug. A blood sample was then 
demanded under s. 254(3.4). The accused did not 
request nor was he given further access to counsel 
after the DRE was completed but before his blood 
was drawn. Subsequent toxicological analysis 
indicated that his blood contained central nervous 
system depressants - Valium (Diazepam) and several 
active metabolites of Valium and Mirtazapine.  Also 
found in his blood was methadone that, when 
combined with central nervous system depressants, 
can exacerbate impairment. The other occupant of 
the Mustang  also died and the accused was 
subsequently charged with two counts of impaired 
driving  causing  death and two counts of dangerous 
driving causing death.
Nova Scotia Supreme Court
The accused argued the evidence of his 
blood samples and their analysis should 
be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter 
because  the police failed to provide him 
with an additional opportunity to consult counsel 
after the demand for a blood sample but before the 
blood was drawn. The judge, however, disagreed. 
The accused was aware of the extent of his jeopardy 
when he consulted legal counsel. He understood the 
demand for a drug  evaluation test and was aware the 
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police wanted to test him to determine whether there 
were drugs in his body in relation to his arrest for 
impaired driving  by drug. He spoke with legal 
counsel for about 15 minutes following  the demand 
for a drug  evaluation test and it was reasonable to 
infer that competent counsel would have advised 
him of the procedure set out in s. 254 (ie. a  demand 
would be made that he provide bodily samples in 
the event he failed the drug  evaluation test). There 
was no evidence that he did not receive competent 
legal advice or that he did not understand the legal 
advice given. There was no change in the accused’s 
circumstances between the exercising  of his right to 
counsel and the demand for a blood sample which 
would, objectively viewed, require a further 
consultation with counsel. There was no s. 10(b) 
Charter breach, the evidence was admissible, and 
the accused was convicted on all counts. He was 
sentenced to prison.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed the trial 
judge’s ruling, again arguing  his 
blood sample and the subsequent 
toxicological analysis should have 
been excluded under s. 24(2)  because the police 
breached his s. 10(b) right when they failed to 
provide him with an opportunity to re-consult 
counsel after the demand for his blood.  
Under R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, it was recognized 
that s. 10(b)  normally  affords the detainee a single 
consultation with counsel unless circumstances 
change such that a  further opportunity to consult a 
lawyer will be required. Such situations requiring  an 
additional consultation with counsel include:
• New non-routine procedures involving  the 
detainee, such as participation in a line-up or 
submitting  to a polygraph, which will not 
generally fall within the expectation of the 
advising  lawyer at the time of the initial 
consultation.
• A change in jeopardy such as when the 
investigation takes a new and more serious turn 
as events unfold.
• There is reason to question the detainee’s 
understanding of their s. 10(b) such as when 
events indicate that a detainee who has waived 
their right to counsel may not have understood 
their right.
In this case, the accused asserted that the request for 
blood was a change of circumstance requiring  a 
further opportunity to consult counsel. In his view, 
ss. 254(3.1) and (3.4) establishes a unique two-step 
process and legal advice should accompany each 
step. Since, at the time of the DRE demand, the 
police did not tell him of the potential for blood 
sampling  later on, then both steps - the DRE and the 
blood sampling - required a s. 10(b) advisement.
The accused’s argument was rejected by the Court of 
Appeal. Justice Fichaud stated:
... In my view, a blood demand under s. 254(3.4) 
would occupy the expectation of the advising 
lawyer during the DRE consultation under s. 254
(3.1). The point of the DRE is to determine 
whether to demand a fluids sample.  That is clear 
from s. 254(3.4): “If, on completion of the 
evaluation, the evaluating officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe, based on the evaluation, that 
the person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle … 
is impaired by a drug … the evaluating  officer 
may … demand” a sample of saliva, urine 
or blood.
The DRE and blood demand are not 
disjunctive investigative techniques. 
Rather, the DRE culminates in the fluids 
demand. That linear progression is 
apparent from the plain words of ss. 254
(3.1) and (3.4), with which competent 
counsel would be familiar. During the DRE 
consultation with the client, competent 
counsel would expect that a failed DRE 
likely would trigger a demand for blood, 
urine or saliva, and would advise the client 
respecting that eventuality.  [paras. 47-49]
“In my view, a blood demand under s. 254(3.4) would occupy the expectation of the 
advising lawyer during the DRE consultation under s. 254(3.1). The point of the DRE is 
to determine whether to demand a fluids sample.” 
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Without evidence of the content of the accused’s 
legal advice that preceded the DRE or that his 
counsel acted incompetently, the judge made no 
error in finding  that the police did not have to 
provide an additional opportunity for the accused to 
consult counsel. His appeal was dismissed and his 
convictions were upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
‘ITO’	 GROUNDS	 NOT	 TO	 BE	 
FRAGMENTED	 BUT	 RATHER	 
CONSIDERED	 IN	 TOTALITY
R. v. Liberatore, 2014 NSCA 109 
A police officer swore an Information 
to Obtain (ITO)  a s. 487 Criminal 
Code search warrant to search a 
residence owned by the accused and 
his mother. The ITO said there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that a .45 semi-
automatic handgun; a 9 mm semi-automatic 
handgun; a .38 revolver; and .45, 9 mm and .38 
calibre ammunition would be found on the 
premises. The ITO cited information from other 
police officers, Sources A, B and C, and from the 
investigation. Included in the  ITO was the following 
information:
• The accused had a criminal record dating from 
2000 to 2011 for weapons and drug  related 
offences; 
• Source A, who had been a source for less than a 
month, provided information based on personal 
knowledge obtained from conversations and 
observations of the persons involved that the 
accused was selling marijuana and cocaine from a 
shed located on his property; that he had three 
handguns, a .45 calibre pistol, a 9mm. pistol and 
a .38 calibre revolver which were kept in a locked 
toolbox in his shed; that he had two white trucks, 
a Chevrolet Silverado and a GMC Sierra Dinali, 
which he parked next to a shed on his property, 
and that his residence was under renovation. 
Source A had a criminal record, associated freely 
with persons involved in criminal activity and was 
financially motivated to provide information.
• The officer followed up on the information and 
saw two white trucks matching the descriptions 
given by Source A parked next to a shed located 
across the land from a residence, which appeared 
to be under renovation.  Investigation confirmed 
that the properties on which the shed and 
residence were located were owned by the 
accused and his mother.  The officer also 
corroborated that one of the two trucks he saw 
was registered to the accused but could not 
confirm the registered owner of the second truck 
because he could not see its licence plate number.
BY THE BOOK:
DRE: ss. 254(3.1) & (3.4) Criminal Code
Evaluation
(3.1) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds 
to believe that a person is committing, or at 
any time within the previous three hours has 
committed, an offence under paragraph 253
(1)(a) as a result of the consumption of a drug or of a 
combination of alcohol and a drug, the peace officer may, by 
demand made as soon as practicable, require the person to 
submit, as soon as practicable, to an evaluation conducted by 
an evaluating officer to determine whether the person’s 
ability to operate a motor vehicle ... is impaired by a drug or 
by a combination of alcohol and a drug, and to accompany 
the peace officer for that purpose.
...
Samples of bodily substances
(3.4) If, on completion of the evaluation, the evaluating 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe, based on the 
evaluation, that the person’s ability to operate a motor 
vehicle ... is impaired by a drug or by a combination of 
alcohol and a drug, the evaluating officer may, by demand 
made as soon as practicable, require the person to provide, 
as soon as practicable,
(a)  a sample of either oral fluid or urine that, in the 
evaluating officer’s opinion, will enable a proper analysis to 
be made to determine whether the person has a drug in their 
body; or
(b)  samples of blood that, in the opinion of the qualified 
medical practitioner or qualified technician taking the 
samples, will enable a proper analysis to be made to 
determine whether the person has a drug in their body.
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• Source B said the accused was selling  drugs from 
a shed on his property; that he had three guns in 
his shed; a .45 calibre, a .38  calibre and another 
unknown handgun; that these guns had been at 
the accused’s place the previous week and that 
the accused had these guns since before 
Christmas.  Source B provided this information 
based on their direct observation of and 
conversations with persons who were the subject 
of the information.  Source B had provided 
information on prior occasions, had proven to be 
reliable, and their information had resulted in the 
seizure of contraband.  Source B was financially 
motivated.
• Source C’s information, provided four years 
earlier, was about the accused becoming a big 
drug dealer and keeping  a 9 mm. pistol in the 
passenger s ide door o f h is g i r l f r iend’s 
vehicle. Source C’s information had previously led 
to the search and seizure of crime related property 
or drugs and the laying of criminal charges.
• The accused’s residence had also been the scene 
of three home invasions in a four year period and 
little of value had been taken during these 
incidents.  In two of these incidents the 
perpetrators were armed with handguns and other 
w e a p o n s w e r e u s e d d u r i n g t h e t h i r d 
incident. During  the first incident, when only the 
accused’s mother was present, she refused to 
allow the responding officers to enter one of the 
rooms in the residence. Items in the residence 
consistent with a marijuana grow operation and 
drug trafficking were observed. During the second 
home invasion the accused did not immediately 
call the police but called some friends and his 
mother. The accused’s girlfriend called the police 
and, when they arrived, the accused said nothing 
was taken during the incident.
• In many cases where persons produce or sell 
drugs they often keep firearms or other weapons 
for protection.
The warrant was issued and executed the following 
day. The search uncovered several replica firearms, 
but not the weapons specified in the ITO.  The police 
found a  knife that opened by centrifugal force, 
sandwich bags containing  cocaine (33.3 grams, 12.2 
grams, and 5 grams), a dime bag  with 25 ecstasy 
pills, a bag  with 83.4 grams of marihuana, 
marihuana packaged for resale (1.1, 2.0 and 3.5 
gram bags), many large bags with marihuana 
residue, a mason jar with 701 meth pills and 5 
ecstasy pills, and a bottle of valium. The search also 
disclosed weigh scales, empty plastic  bags and three 
spoons with white residue. The accused was charged 
with weapons and drug offences.
Nova Scotia Supreme Court
The accused sought the exclusion of 
evidence, contending  that the ITO lacked 
reasonable and probable grounds to 
establish a factual nexus between the 
weapons offences for which the search warrant was 
sought and the premises to be searched.  The judge 
disagreed and determined that the issuing  justice had 
reasonable and probable grounds to establish the 
factual nexus. Finding  the warrant properly issued., 
the judge stated:
The ITO established a factual nexus between the 
items to be searched for and the location to be 
searched.  It was not based on mere conclusory 
statements but rather on the personal 
observations and conversations of two Sources 
with the [accused]. These Sources both indicated 
that the [accused] was dealing drugs from a shed 
located on his property; that the [accused] had 
three firearms; the Sources described the calibre 
of weapons they had seen or been told of by the 
[accused] in the previous one to four 
weeks.  Some of the information provided by 
Source A was corroborated by the affiant ... such 
as the location of the shed; that it was across the 
road from the [accused’s] residence which was 
under renovation; the make, model and colour 
of the [accused’s] vehicles and where they were 
parked.
The ITO also contained facts regarding  the 
[accused’s] criminal record for drug  and 
weapons offences; the three home invasions over 
a four year period, two of which were by armed 
gunmen; and the affiant’s statement, based on 
experience and training that drug dealers often 
keep firearms or other weapons for protection.
In conclusion, the justice had before him 
reasonable and probable grounds establishing  a 
factual nexus between the offences for which the 
warrant was sought and the places to be 
searched.  The search warrant was properly 
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issued and the evidence obtained as a result of 
the search is admissible.
The accused then pled guilty to two weapons 
offences and five counts of possessing  controlled 
substances for the purpose of trafficking. He was 
sentenced to three years in prison.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d t h e 
reviewing  judge’s ruling  that the 
ITO contained sufficient reliable 
information that the issuing  justice 
could find that there were reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that there was a handgun and 
ammunition on the property. The Crown indicated 
that it would not rely on Source C’s information in 
seeking  to uphold the validity of the search warrant 
because  it was so dated that it would have been of 
no value.
In challenging  the judge’s reasoning, the accused 
sought to deconstruct the ITO.  He submitted that the 
ITO’s only evidence of the  presence of weapons on 
the premises was the affiant’s hearsay derived from 
Sources A and B. Everything  else, such as his 
criminal history, was propensity evidence, 
reputational, and distracting. He sought to dispose of 
Source  A’s information as being  unreliable because it 
was stale (being  a month old), they had a criminal 
record, was motivated by financial gain, and was 
unproven - their information had not yet led to an 
arrest. As for Source B, the accused contended his 
information about the guns was a “bald” assertion, 
with no detail regarding  date, time, place and 
frequency of observations . Further, the  language 
used in the ITO that Source B’s information was 
“based upon direct observat ions of , and 
conversations with persons who are the subject of 
the information” was “mere boilerplate, intended to 
whitewash over perceived deficiencies in the  ITO”. 
With these attacks on the information in the ITO, the 
ITO as dismantled crumbled and there remained no 
reliable basis for the warrant.
Justice Fichaud, for the unanimous Court of Appeal, 
rejected these arguments. The test for determining 
whether a warrant was properly issued is not 
whether the reviewing  court would itself have issue 
the warrant. Instead, the test is whether there was 
sufficient credible and reliable  evidence to permit 
the authorizing  justice to find reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that an offence had 
been committed and that evidence of that offence 
would be found at the specified time and place. As 
for the ITO in this case, Justice Fichaud held:
The reliability of the information is assessed by 
recourse to “the totality of the circumstances”, 
including  its degree of detail, the informer’s 
source of knowledge and indicia such as the 
informer’s past reliability and confirmation from 
other sources.  Even an anonymous tip attracts 
the inquiries - how compelling  was the 
information, how credible was the source, and 
was the information corroborated by other 
evidence? The body of evidence isn’t anatomized 
for a segregated analysis of each fragment.  
Viewed as a whole, its bits may be cross-
confirmatory.
Source A was a tipster. But the tip’s detail 
demonstrated specific knowledge of the 
weapons and their recent location, [the 
accused’s] premises, shed and vehicles, and his 
drug trafficking  activities.  The detail was sourced 
in the informant’s personal observation.  Source 
“The reliability of the information is 
assessed by recourse to ‘the totality of 
the circumstances’, including its degree of 
detail, the informer’s source of knowledge 
and indicia such as the informer’s past 
reliability and confirmation from other 
sources. Even an anonymous tip attracts 
the inquiries - how compelling was the 
information, how credible was the source, 
and was the information corroborated by 
other evidence? The body of evidence 
isn’t anatomized for a segregated analysis 
of each fragment.  Viewed as a whole, its 
bits may be cross-confirmatory.”
Volume 15 Issue 1 - January/February 2015
PAGE 36
A was untested, and his past reliability unknown.  
But his information was corroborated externally 
in several respects – [the accused’s] ownership of 
the premises, its layout, shed and description of 
the house renovations, and the make of vehicles 
observed by the police on the premises.
Source A’s information was significantly 
corroborated by Source B.
Source B was a tested informant of four years, 
whose information had proved to be accurate 
and actionable, leading to arrests. His 
information was current, and from personal 
observation.   He gave specific details of the 
guns, [the accused’s] premises and drug 
trafficking operations.
The evidence of [the accused’s] criminal history 
of convictions showed that possession of a 
firearm was not an isolated event. Drug and 
weapons offences going  back ten years tended to 
corroborate the inference that weapons 
pertained to [the accused’s] activities in the drug 
trade.
The ITO set out the history of three home 
invasions and a robbery at [the accused’s] 
premises, and the reluctance of [the accused] 
and his mother to allow the police entry or to 
cooperate with the police investigation of those 
offences.  As [the reviewing  judge] noted, these 
facts also occupied the broad field of 
circumstances from which a corroborative 
i n f e r e n c e o f i l l i c i t a c t i v i t y m a y 
spring.  [references omitted, paras. 27-32]
The Court of Appeal agreed that the issuing  justice, 
having  recourse to the totality of the circumstances, 
could conclude that there were reasonable and 
probable grounds to establish a factual nexus 
between the offences for which the  warrant was 
sought and the accused’s premises. The warrant was 
properly issued and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ARRESTEE’s	 BEHAVIOUR	 
PREVENTED	 s.	 10	 ADVISEMENT:	 
NO	 BREACH	 AT	 THAT	 TIME
R. v. Boliver, 2014 NSCA 99
The accused exited a mall in which a 
lounge was located and began 
confronting  the police who were 
outside. He was loud, aggressive and 
quickly became out of control in this 
confrontation. He attracted a significant amount of 
attention, was causing  a disturbance, and acting  in a 
manner consistent with an inebriated state. When he 
was advised he was under arrest, a violent struggle 
ensued in which officers attempted to handcuff 
him.  They got one handcuff on but fell to the 
ground.  The accused, a very large man, thrashed 
about with the handcuffs flailing  from his one cuffed 
wrist.The crowd that had gathered became more 
vocal and police tried a number of holds, hand 
strikes, and pressure point applications, to no avail. 
Police issued a warning  that if the accused did not 
stop  resisting  and put his hands behind his back he 
would be tasered.  He did not comply and was 
tasered.  A second deployment of the taser was 
necessary  to bring  the accused under control. He 
was handcuffed and brought to the police car where 
he continued to be  violent, screaming, cursing  and 
banging  on the window.  He kicked the rear door 
with so much force he damaged it, leaving  it bowed 
outward. He was eventually  transported from police 
cells to the hospital where he could be assessed. His 
emotional state was such that it was not possible for 
the police to explain the reason for his detention, the 
nature of the charges, or his right to counsel until 
after his return to the police station from the hospital.
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
The accused asserted, among  other 
Charter allegations, that his ss. 10(a)  and 
(b)  rights had been breached. He argued 
that at no time during  his arrest, or his 
transportation to the holding  cell or to the hospital, 
was he informed of the reason for it. Further he 
contended that he was never informed of his right to 
contact legal counsel, given an opportunity to 
contact legal counsel, or provided with the legal aid 
number for duty counsel.
www.10-8.ca 
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The judge found that the accused was informed of 
the fact that he was being  placed under arrest, but 
that the officer did not get the opportunity to say 
anything  more than “you’re under arrest.” The reason 
for the arrest had been public intoxication and a 
breach of the peace that had unfolded as a result of 
the accused’s actions. Once the officers placed their 
hands on either side of the accused to get him to the 
police car, he began to violently resist, which 
resulted in his tasering  and handcuffing. When 
placed in the police car, his actions remained out of 
control. He was  banging  against the interior of the 
vehicle and also kicking  the rear door. Even upon 
being  taken to the police station, the accused did not  
moderate his actions to the point where it was 
possible  to have meaningful interaction with him. 
However, at some point during  the night the 
necessary  information could have been provided to 
him. Thus, the accused’s s. 10(a) and 10(b)  rights 
were violated by the police. However, no remedy for 
these breaches, including  the stay of proceedings 
sought by the accused, was imposed. He was 
convicted of resisting  arrest, damage to property and 
public intoxication. He was sentenced to a fine and 
twelve months’ probation.
Nova Scotia Supreme Court
The appeal judge was satisfied that the 
trial judge did not err in deciding  that no 
s. 10 violation occurred at the time of 
arrest. “Virtually all of the actions which 
constituted elements of offences for which he was 
charged were committed long  before the police 
would have had a reasonable opportunity to explain 
the charges to him and his right to counsel,”  said the 
appeal judge. He also agreed that the ss. 10(a)  and 
(b)  violations had no effect on the charges against 
the accused and therefore there was no evidence 
obtained as a result of these violations, so there was 
nothing  to exclude. As well, he agreed the breaches 
did not warrant a remedy. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed again, 
arguing, in part, that the violation 
of this s. 10(a)  and 10(b)  rights 
rendered his arrest unlawful. In 
upholding  the lower judgments, Justice Bryson stated 
the following:
Section 10(a) of the Charter entitles everyone 
arrested or detained “to be informed promptly of 
the reasons therefor”.  Section 10(b) entitles 
everyone who is arrested or detained “to retain 
and instruct counsel without delay and to be 
informed of that right”.  The information 
obligation described in s. 10(b) of the Charter is 
subject to the need to secure officer or public 
safety.
Section 29(2) of the Code also requires that 
everyone who arrests a person must give notice 
“when it is feasible to do so” of the reason for 
the arrest. [references omitted, paras. 11-12]
However, the  Court of Appeal observed that the trial 
judge found the officers were fully occupied with 
responding  to the  accused’s violent behaviour which 
precluded them from informing  him of the reasons 
for his arrest at that time. It was the accused’s own 
behaviour that produced the situation which made it 
practically impossible  to do so. Thus, there was no s. 
10(a)  violation at that time.  And the subsequent 
violation of his s. 10 later on had no effect on the 
charges against him. No evidence was obtained as a 
result of the violation of his rights, so there was no 
evidence to exclude as a result.  In all the 
circumstances, the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
breaches did not warrant a remedy were  owed 
deference.  The accused’s appeal was again 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The information obligation described in 
s. 10(b) of the Charter is subject to the 
need to secure officer or public safety.”
“Section 29(2) of the Code also requires 
that everyone who arrests a person must 
give notice “when it is feasible to do so” of 
the reason for the arrest.”
Volume 15 Issue 1 - January/February 2015
PAGE 38
NEW	 K9	 RULES	 FOR	 BC
On September 1, 2015, new British Columbia 
Provincial Policing  Standards (BCPPS)  concerning 
the use of police dogs will take effect. “The goal of 
the Provincial Standards for police service dogs is to 
have effective and accountable  police service dog 
units, which minimize bites and injuries, without 
hindering  the appropriate use of police service dogs 
to further public  safety,” it states in the BCPPS 1.4. 
The standards outline eight principles:
• Police dogs are important policing  tools and can 
be used for a variety of tasks. 
• Police dogs are also intermediate weapons; police 
dogs bite. 
• A police dog bite can cause injury.
• The use of a dog, as with all other force options, 
must be proportional to the level of risk posed to 
the officer, the suspect and the community as a 
whole. 
• Police dog  bites must be minimized as much as 
reasonably possible and must be proportional to 
the risk posed to the handler and to others. 
• Police dogs must be well trained. They require 
high levels of initial training, and continuous 
maintenance of their performance. 
• Police dogs must always be under control of their 
handler, and the handler is always responsible for 
the behaviour of their dog.
• There must be accountability for the use of police 
dogs.
Permitted Uses of Police Dogs
Authorized uses of police dogs include:
• Tracking  or searching  for persons who may have 
committed, or be about to commit, an offence;
• Apprehending  persons by police dog  bite or 
display; 
• Tracking or searching for missing or lost persons; 
• Searching for drugs; 
• Searching for explosives/firearms;
• Searching for evidence; 
• Crowd control;
• Community relations and other demonstration 
events.
Threshold and Circumstances of Use
The Standards also outline the threshold and 
circumstances of using  a  police dog  where a  bite 
may occur. Section 1.4.2 states that a chief 
constable, chief officer, or commissioner must:(1)
“Prohibit police dog handlers from permitting a police 
dog to bite a person, and prohibit dog handlers from 
permitting a police dog to continue to be deployed if 
it would reasonably be expected that the police dog 
would bite a person, unless:
(a) The person is causing bodily harm to an officer, a 
third party or the police dog; 
(b) The police dog handler is satisfied, on reasonable 
grounds, that the person’s behaviour will 
imminently cause bodily harm to an officer, a third 
party, or the police dog; or 
(c) The person is fleeing or hiding and there are 
reasonable grounds for their immediate 
apprehension by a police dog bite.”
Reasonable grounds is defined in the Standard as 
having  “both a subjective and an objective 
component, and means that the officer must 
personally believe that the decision or action is 
necessary, and in addition, the decision or action must 
be able to stand the test of whether an objective third 
person, who is acting reasonably—and is informed of 
the officer's training, experience and the factual 
circumstances known at the time—would also reach 
the same conclusion.”
Other things the Standards address include training, 
certification, warnings, removing  the dog  from a 
bite, searching, reporting and data. 
The complete Provincial Policing  Standards are 
available here.
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